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(SUB)URBAN POVERTY AND REGIONAL
INTEREST CONVERGENCE
PATIENCE A. CROWDER*
Poverty has expanded from America’s urban cores to its inner and
outer suburban rings. In the midst of spreading hardship, new
opportunities for confronting questions of regional equity are emerging,
such as how best to govern our regional spaces for the benefit of all
regional constituents, including the poor, middle class, and affluent. To
date, governance theories have proven inadequate to this task. In the
parlance of the current regional governance discourse, localists,
regionalists, and new regionalists need a framework to make a reality of
their seemingly disparate and inconsistent visions of local versus regional
interests. Localists champion the autonomy of local governments as the
appropriate form of regional management. Regionalists, on the other
hand, advocate for mechanisms of regional governance to manage the
maintenance and development of regional spaces. While new regionalists
have advocated practical steps to eliminate the causes of regional
inequities, encouraging more efficient fiscal and land use planning
cooperation between local governments in a metropolitan region, new
regionalism as a social movement is stalled largely because it has existed
as a set of ideals without a framework for effectuating those ideals. This
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Article introduces a new strategy, regional interest convergence, as a new
social justice framework to effectuate new regionalism and revive the
movement. Regional interest convergence, a reconceptualization of the
interest convergence theory first articulated by Professor Derrick Bell,
provides a framework for beginning to address both urban and suburban
poverty.
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INTRODUCTION

“Poverty is not an accident. Like slavery and apartheid, it is man-made
and can be removed by the actions of human beings.”
—Nelson Mandela1
“A Region,” somebody has wryly said, “is an area safely larger than
the last one to whose problems we found no solution.”
—Jane Jacobs2
America’s War on Poverty began approximately fifty years ago
under the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.3 While a
“war” is typically defined as a state of open, armed conflict between
parties,4 the War on Poverty pitted legislative and policy tools of
government against not a party but, as the quotes above assert, a
condition that lies within our collective control to alleviate.5 Of course,
having the ability to do something and wanting to do that something are
two different things. Comprehensively altering the course of poverty in
America will require a fundamental shift in our approach to poverty
relief. Because the dynamism of poverty manifests itself in myriad ways,
an important first step is to make sure that we have a shared
understanding of poverty. To that end, I invite you, the reader, to take
the following short quiz to test your poverty IQ.

1. Chris Williams, The Price of Politics and Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2012,
12:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-williams/the-price-of-politics-and_b_2105160
.html (quoting former South African President Nelson Mandela) (internal quotation marks
omitted), archived at http://perma.cc/DS4X-8SQ9 (last updated Jan. 13, 2013, 5:12 AM).
2. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 410 (1961)
(commenting on the general planning process and quoting an unnamed person).
3. See, e.g., Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE L.J. 1317, 1317 (1964).
4. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1545 (4th ed. 2010).
5. Cahn, supra note 3, at 1317–18.
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Metropolitan Poverty Quiz
1. True or False. Nearly 16.5 million people live in poverty in the
suburb[s], in comparison with about 13 million poor people in
American cities.6
2. True or False. More than 50 million Americans, or 1 in 6, are
food insecure (do not have reliable sources of affordable and
nutritious food).7
3. True or False. The pace of suburban poverty growth is more
than twice as fast as the poverty rate in urban areas.8
4. True or False. The lowest paying jobs are in urban areas.9
5. True or False. It is easier to find affordable housing in urban
areas than in the suburbs.10
How did you do? What was the most surprising fact that you
learned? Were you surprised to learn that there are more people living
in poverty in the suburbs than our urban cores? This surge is becoming
a defining characteristic of our metropolitan regions as poverty stretches
from its traditional home in central cities to their surrounding suburbs—
effectively expanding the battlegrounds of the War on Poverty.11

6. True. Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, PRESS TV (May 21,
2013, 2:10 AM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/21/304565/suburban-poverty-soaring-inamerica/, archived at http://perma.cc/8E3W-TNYT.
7. True. See Speakers Bureau Housing and Poverty Stats 2014, http://jim.reutler.org/hab
itat/updates/speakers-bureau-housing-and.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014), archived at http://pe
rma.cc/93ND-758E (citing ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN, MARK NORD & ANITA SINGH, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 8 (2012),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1183208/err-155.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G
HQ9-EQAR).
8. True. Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, supra note 6.
9. False. Id. (“‘The lowest paying jobs are the most suburbanized,’ [Kneebone] said.
‘Retail services, constructions jobs, manufacturing even.’”).
10. Neither. This is sort of a trick question. Affordable quality rental housing is
increasingly difficult to find in both urban and suburban areas. The rental market in the
suburbs, however, is steadily increasing. Today, 40% of all renters reside in the suburbs. See
Barbara Ray, The Squeeze is on for Affordable Rentals in the Suburbs, CONFRONTING
SUBURBAN POVERTY AM. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://confrontingsuburbanpoverty.org/2014/02/th
e-squeeze-is-on-for-affordable-rentals-in-the-suburbs/, archived at http://perma.cc/J8JWKV7Q.
11. See Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, supra note 6.
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More recently, the economic devastation wrought by the Great
Recession12 has forever altered the character of America’s suburbs. The
expansion of poverty from the central cities throughout metropolitan
regions is a phenomenon that brings new dimensions to the character of
American poverty.13
This Article is structured around two symbiotic principles: (1)
poverty is a condition that affects all regional constituents, and (2)
poverty alleviation benefits all regional constituents. It examines the
expanse of regional poverty and regional inequities through lenses of
local and regional governance theories. While poverty alleviation is
largely funded by federal and state dollars, it is local government that
bears the majority of the responsibility for the execution of poverty
alleviation programs.14
While the expansion of poverty creates
undeniable hardship, it also creates new opportunities for thinking
about regional equity15 and to best how govern our regional spaces for
the benefit of all residents of the region, including the poor, middle
class, and affluent.
To date, governance theories have proven
inadequate and unequal to this task. As efforts to cope with poverty are
now firmly entrenched in the suburbs,16 an opportunity to think about
how to operationalize regional governance theories should be
considered.

12. The Great Recession started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. See Press
Release, Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research (Sept. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K8ZN-M95Y.
It is “the longest recession of the post-World War II era.” Neil Irwin & Nia-Malika
Henderson, Recession is Officially Over, but Anxiety Lingers, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2010,
at A1.
13. Increased rates of poverty resulting from the economic crisis are not heavily
disputed; however, there are some who dispute the notion of a “new suburban poverty” based
upon the classification of suburb versus smaller central city. See Joe Kriesberg, More
Suburban Poor? Think Again, ROOFLINES: SHELTERFORCE BLOG (June 7, 2013),
http://www.rooflines.org/3252/more_suburban_poor_think_again/, archived at http://perma.cc/
32PY-953K (arguing that the expansion of suburban poverty depends upon the definition of
“suburb” and that what some researchers have defined as “suburban” are actually small
central cities).
14. See Liz Farmer, Can Cities and Suburbs Work Together?, GOVERNING (Mar. 13,
2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Can-Cities-and-Their-Suburbs-Work-Toget
her-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UV3E-XBTB.
15. See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
16. Alan Berube, Senior Fellow and Deputy Dir., Metro. Policy Program, The State of
Metropolitan America: Suburbs and the 2010 Census (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.b
rookings.edu/research/speeches/2011/07/14-census-suburbs-berube, archived at http://perma.c
c/VCX8-P2MX.
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Today’s metropolitan regions are comprised of both the urban and
the suburban. While urban central cities may have larger populations, it
does not follow that urban central cities dominate regional spaces as
they used to in the 1950s and 1960s.17 Instead, the character of a
metropolitan region is determined by the various localities within it. For
example, metropolitan regions such as Chicago and San Francisco house
hundreds of municipalities.18
The modern regional governance debate is centered on the question
of whether metropolitan regions19 are better managed through the
individualized efforts of local governments or through cooperative
regional governance approaches.20 Metropolitan regions are home to a
diverse range of regional constituent groups, each with its own
respective interests. In the parlance of the current regional governance
discourse, there are two broadly defined categories of regional
constituent groups: regionalists and localists.21 Regionalists advocate for
mechanisms of regional governance to manage the maintenance and
development of regional spaces.22 Localists, on the other hand,
champion the autonomy of local governments as the appropriate form
of regional management.23 While these two groups are at the opposite
ends of the regional governance discourse, there is a third voice in the
discourse: new regionalism. New regionalists advocate measures to
eliminate the causes of regional inequities, encourage more efficient
fiscal cooperation between local governments in the same metropolitan
region, and seek to identify new resources for cooperative land use
planning.24 The new regionalist movement, however, is a stalled
movement because, until now, it has existed as a set of ideals without a
framework for effectuating those ideals. This Article considers a new
strategy—regional interest convergence—as a new social justice
strategy to effectuate new regionalism and revive the movement.
17. See BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION:
HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 47
(2013).
18. See id. at 2.
19. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 51–52
(2012).
22. Id. at 62–63.
23. Id. at 53.
24. Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for
Regional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007).
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Regional interest convergence25 is a reconceptualization of the
interest convergence theory first articulated by Professor Derrick Bell.26
Broadly stated, interest convergence theory explains that where parties
in unequal positions of power have divergent interests, to advance its
goals, the subordinate party must find commonality between its interests
and the interests of the majority party.27 The application of the interest
convergence theory to regional governance is a novel yet logical next
step for constructing mechanisms to align the interests of residents of
regional communities and address poverty throughout metropolitan
communities. To date, however, Bell’s theory has been largely applied
in litigation strategies.28
Regional interest convergence has the potential to be a
comprehensive anti-poverty mechanism designed specifically to alleviate
regional inequity. It operates at the intersection of regional planning,
local government law, economic development policy, negotiation, and
community organizing, and provides the structure to create a blueprint
for identifying metropolitan regional constituent groups and their
interests to determine points of convergence among these disparate
interests to achieve regional equity. The Article proceeds as follows:
Part II documents the growth and development of America’s
metropolitan regions and regional inequities to demonstrate the urgent
need for regional interest convergence. Highlighting the current
suburban poverty crisis and the shrinking middle class, Part II also
situates this discussion in the modern regional governance conversation
by exploring the successes and failures of the predominant governance
theories overlaying metropolitan regions: localism, regionalism, and new
regionalism. Part III reconceptualizes the interest convergence theory
to apply it in the regional governance context and presents the interest

25. While new regionalism exists without a succinct definition, there have been several
superb articles exploring new regionalism’s impact on regional equity. See, e.g., Lisa T.
Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable
Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2011); Parlow, supra note 21, at 64–67;
Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches to
New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297 (2012).
26. Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 254 (2005).
27. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980) (arguing that interest convergence would not
occur if the status quo of the dominant party would be negatively impacted).
28. See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 925 (2007).
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convergence methodology. Part IV sketches a framework for the
implementation of regional interest convergence as a new regionalist
strategy for achieving regional equity and navigates and explores
practical opportunities for regional interest convergence.
II. THE CAUSES AND PERSISTENCE OF REGIONAL INEQUITY
Regions are becoming increasingly important in the American
landscape.29 Unlike states and cities, regions are not formal legal
structures formed by government action. Instead, regions are formed
through engaged networks of commerce and custom and are becoming
increasingly important cultural and political actors.30 Regions are
complex mosaics of culture, economics, and geography, with dual
identities as “regional spaces” and “spaces of regionalism.” Stated
differently, a region is both an economic unit with an objective nature
and defined geographical boundaries and a “created territory” formed
for “political mobilization and . . . cultural expression.”31 There are close
to 400 metropolitan regions in the United States,32 and these regions are
increasing in national and international prominence as economic
actors.33 Metropolitan regions house the overwhelming majority of the
country’s residents. Almost two-thirds of the American population lives
in the 100 largest metropolitan regions,34 which is only 12% of the
country’s land mass.35 Moreover, 85% of the nation’s immigrants and
77% of the nation’s minority population live in metropolitan regions.36

29. See, e.g., Judith Rodin, Foreword to KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 17, at vii, vii.
30. See id. at vii–viii.
31. See MANUEL PASTOR JR., CHRIS BENNER & MARTHA MATSUOKA, THIS COULD
BE THE START OF SOMETHING BIG: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR REGIONAL EQUITY
ARE RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA 53 (2009) (citing Martin Jones & Gordon
MacLeod, Regional Spaces, Spaces of Regionalism: Territory, Insurgent Politics and the
English Question, 29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 433 (2004)).
32. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 1
(2002); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
BULLETIN NO. 13-01, at 22 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/o
mb/bulletins/2013/b-13-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B88-APGN.
33. E.g., Rodin, supra note 29, at vii, 2.
34. Id. at 1; see also ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT
BROOKINGS, THE GREAT RECESSION AND POVERTY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICAN
(2010).
35. KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 17, at 1.
36. See METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, METROPOLICY: SHAPING A NEW
FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A METROPOLITAN NATION 4 (2008).
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There are distinctions between regions, generally, and metropolitan
regions, specifically. The Census Bureau defines metropolitan regions
as having an urban core central city with a population that exceeds
50,000 people and several adjacent, lesser populated suburban localities
that are highly socially and economically integrated with the core.37 It is
important to understand the common history behind the development
of these spaces to identify the root causes of regional inequity, better
address its current iterations, and maximize the economic and political
potential of regional spaces.
Regional inequity encompasses the range of social and economic
disparities between residents in a metropolitan region. It speaks to
power imbalances, unequal access to public resources, and wealth gaps
between localities within the same metropolitan region. Examples
include disparities between unemployment rates, the availability of
affordable housing, the recruitment of commercial retail, and the
funding of public schools.38 Its causes are multifaceted and complex,
simultaneously reflecting public policy, personal prejudices and choice,
and the operation of law.39 Regional inequities surfaced concomitant
with the initial development of metropolitan regions—beginning with
the incorporation of the first suburbs,40 which were formed to be an
escape from urban America and poverty.41 There is, in fact, a direct link
between the origins of the first suburbs and the current expanse of
suburban poverty that is one of the legacies of the Great Recession.42

37. Metropolitan regions are formally distinguished from nonmetropolitan regions by
their higher populations and informally by the diversity of their populations. Neither
metropolitan regions nor nonmetropolitan regions are confined to state boundaries. For
example, the New York Metropolitan Statistical Area (commonly referred to as a tri-state
area) is comprised of counties from the states of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 32, at 2. The proposals presented in the
article are applicable to both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions; however, this
Article is focused on the story of metropolitan regional development. It goes without saying
that nonmetropolitan regions have their own unique challenges that warrant study.
38. See generally DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES
FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999).
39. See id. at 316–35.
40. See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional
Redistribution of Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 6, 10
(1995).
41. ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN POVERTY
IN AMERICA 6–7 (2013).
42. Id. at 35.
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The persistence of regional inequity is directly related to (1) the
nature of the social and political systems that created the suburbs,43 (2)
the intransigent nature of regional inequity as evidenced by the ongoing
expansion of suburban poverty,44 and (3) governance failures in
metropolitan regions. 45 Each of these three factors is discussed below.
A. The Simultaneous Emergence of Metropolitan Regions and Regional
Inequity
A significant reason for the persistence of regional inequity is the
way in which metropolitan regions developed—specifically, the
formation of America’s suburban communities. Before there were
metropolitan regions, the American landscape consisted of urban cities
and rural communities. The earliest cities thrived for generations as
urban metropolises surrounded by lesser populated rural spaces.46 City
populations steadily increased as rural residents and immigrants were
enticed by employment opportunities.47 However, the complexion and
class of the incoming residents alarmed much of the existing populace.48
Class, racial, and ethnic tensions began to grow.49 These tensions eased
temporarily during World War I, intensified during the Great
Depression, and eased again during World War II.50 After World War
II, however, city populations grew exponentially.51 In addition to rural
residents and immigrants, African American agricultural workers from
the reconstructing South began relocating to northern cities to find work
in industrial, manufacturing, and service positions.52 The old tensions
intensified but were deflected by the federal government’s new home
ownership programs, which provided a way out of the central city for

43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See infra Part II.B.
45. See infra Part II.C.
46. See G. ROSS STEPHENS & NELSON WIKSTROM, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
AND GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, AND THE
FUTURE 14–15 (2000).
47. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26–27 (1993).
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 29–30.
50. See id. at 30–31.
51. See id. at 27–28, 43.
52. See id. at 26–29; see also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS:
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
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middle-class Americans.53 These home ownership mortgage programs
were not for homes in the central cities but for newly constructed homes
in the emerging surrounding suburban communities—creating a new
type of space that was neither urban nor rural but suburban.54
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, federal policies supported the
development of suburban communities and facilitated racial and
economic segregation between central cities and suburbs. African
Americans were denied access to federal home ownership programs and
loan guarantees, which meant that they could not purchase homes and
did not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction on their personal
income taxes.55 Furthermore, the federal government financed highway
construction to ease suburban entry into and exit out of the central
city.56 At the same time, it financed urban renewal projects that
displaced large numbers of African American central-city residents
from neighborhood communities into public housing and concentrated
poverty.57
Marketed as the American dream, suburbs developed as
communities of detached single-family homes from which residents
drove to central cities for work. Central-city residents, however, were
confined to the city for employment because auto loans were just as
difficult to obtain as home mortgages and, unlike highways, public
transportation did not connect the central city to the suburbs.58 As the
beneficiaries of the federal home loan programs, white middle-class
residents exited central cities en masse, engendering the “white flight”
phenomenon.59 Business and industry also abandoned the central cities
to provide services for the wealthier suburban residents—decimating
central-city tax bases.60 To compensate for the divestment of white
flight, cities sought to salvage their tax bases by annexing some of the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 52–53.
See id. at 53.
See id. at 53–54.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 55–56. See generally MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT (2004) (describing the impact and physiological harm of urban renewal on central-city
residents).
58. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 7–8.
59. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 47, at 52–55.
60. See id. at 55–56, 136, 156.
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newer surrounding communities outside of their boundaries.61 Early
annexations were successful; however, suburban communities petitioned
their state governments to require both central-city and suburban voter
approval of any proposed annexation—effectively ending that
practice.62 The suburbs now existed as autonomous local governments
with the same authority as central cities to tax, provide services, and
regulate land use.63
The suburbs were initially limited to the white middle class and
elites,64 and stark disparities between central cities and the surrounding
suburbs emerged soon after their creation. From the east coast to the
west coast, the ascent of the suburbs propelled the decline of central
cities, and cities experienced an unobstructed deterioration during the
1980s and 1990s.65 This deterioration was supported by suburban land
use practices and legislation, such as exclusionary zoning ordinances that
appear facially neutral but have the practical effect of excluding lowand moderate-income residents.66
These policies and practices
concentrated poverty and trapped central-city residents, consequently
creating a high demand for (and parallel lack of) affordable housing in
central cities while increasing the value of suburban land.67
As affordable and fair housing advocates and community groups
challenged discriminatory housing practices, their efforts led to the
construction of affordable housing in certain suburbs.68 These suburbs
became more socially and economically diverse as residents moved from
the central city. As a result of the influx of mixed incomes, the housing
stock in the suburbs also diversified.69 Single-family homes were still the
norm, but multi-family housing and apartment buildings were also

61. See Judith Welch Wegner, North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores,
and What Next, 91 N.C. L. REV. 165, 168 (2012).
62. See, e.g., id. at 226. See generally Tyson, supra note 25.
63. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 61, at 183–85.
64. See RUSK, supra note 38, at 1–15. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 47,
at 52–55, 44–45.
65. Poindexter, supra note 40, at 10.
66. Id. at 12–13.
67. See id. at 14–15.
68. See, e.g., Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation
for Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 665, 674–80 (1987). The construction of affordable
housing in the suburbs has not been without controversy, as evidenced by the ongoing
challenges in Mount Laurel, New Jersey. See, e.g., David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window:
Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1179 (2008).
69. See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 38, at 168–69.
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constructed.70 Through formal litigation and an informal shift in cultural
norms, the suburbs became less exclusive and more economically and
ethnically diverse.71 This change in complexion, combined with the
1990s’ strong economy and housing boom, prompted many affluent
residents to move deeper into regions and further from central cities to
populate new suburban communities called “exurb[s]”72—designating
the first suburbs adjacent to the central cities the “inner-ring or first-tier
suburbs.”73 Now there were three categories of space in regional spaces:
central cities, inner-ring suburbs, and exurbs.
In many respects today’s suburbs exhibit a very different character
from what was prevalent when the suburbs were first formed. In fact,
the boundaries between many central cities and their inner-ring suburbs
are now blurred for a number of reasons, including the fact that poverty
is now a suburban reality.74 For example, the exodus to the exurbs
resulted in disinvestment in the inner-ring suburbs similar to that
experienced by the central cities decades earlier.75 For any given
locality, this disinvestment led to lower property value assessments,
which, in turn, decreased the volume of public services that locality
could provide.76 While fair share affordable housing laws77 and laws
prohibiting exclusionary zoning78 made leaving the central city a viable
option for central-city residents, the subprime mortgage crises
undermined that goal.79 Another layer of social and economic diversity
comes from the fact that the suburbs are also now the destination for
newly arrived immigrants seeking to be near family who, in years

70. See, e.g., id.
71. McDougall, supra note 68, at 674–80.
72. Exurbs are generally considered low-density communities that extend beyond
suburban communities and house affluent residents. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY 149 (Barney Warf ed., 2006); Wegner, supra note 61, at 257 n.414.
73. Bernadette Hanlon, A Typology of Inner-Ring Suburbs: Class, Race, and Ethnicity
in U.S. Suburbia, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 221, 225 (2009).
74. Berube, supra note 16.
75. See Hanlon, supra note 73, at 235.
76. See, e.g., Poindexter, supra note 40, at 17–22.
77. See, e.g., id. at 40–43.
78. See id. at 35–43 (discussing the trio of fair housing cases from Mt. Laurel, New
Jersey).
79. See Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad
Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker
Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737 (2008); Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability:
Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855.
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before, would have otherwise resided in the central city.80 The
combined effect of these demographic and cultural shifts increased
suburban population growth and improved social and economic
integration.81
As explained in the next section, instead of the idyllic lifestyle
promised in advertising for suburban communities, these communities
are experiencing many of the same poverty-based challenges
traditionally encountered by low-income residents in central-city
neighborhoods.82 There is a persistent tension that dominates the
relationships between central cities and suburbs in metropolitan regions,
and our metropolitan regions are places that house extreme social and
economic disparities.83 These disparities, however, are no longer limited
to inequities between central cities and suburbs. In an extreme
demonstration of irony, many once-idyllic suburbs are experiencing
rates of poverty previously only familiar to residents of central cities.84
B. Expanding Regional Inequity: Suburban Poverty
Social scientists and social service providers have sounded the alarm
about the tightening grip of poverty in many suburban communities. As
discussed above, suburban communities were designed to be middleclass enclaves, leaving poverty to the realm of the central cities.85 As a
result of the housing crisis and Great Recession, the expansion of
suburban poverty has spread to areas poorly equipped to handle the
need.86 Lacking established supportive social services, the experience of
poverty in the suburbs does not mirror poverty in central cities because
there is no infrastructure for poverty alleviation programs.87 On one

80. Historically, immigrants settled in central cities to join families and existing social
networks. Carol Morello & Luz Lazo, Baltimore’s Hope: Immigrants, WASH. POST, July 25,
2012, at A1, available at 2012 WLNR 15661334. However, immigrants have also been able to
participate in the trek outside of the central cities, and new immigrant relatives join them in
the suburbs instead. See, e.g., KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 46; Jill H. Wilson &
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Immigrants Continue to Disperse, with Fastest Growth in the
Suburbs, BROOKINGS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/10/29immigrants-disperse-suburbs-wilson-svajlenka, archived at http://perma.cc/4CV5-WPVZ.
81. KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 44.
82. See infra Part II.A.
83. See Farmer, supra note 14.
84. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 17–20.
85. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
86. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 10, 35.
87. See id. at 10, 88–95.
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hand, regional inequity speaks to wealth and resource disparities
between central cities and suburban communities. On the other hand,
however, the high incidence of suburban poverty should not be
interpreted to suggest an easing of disparities between central cities and
suburbs. Instead, it means that regional inequities exist between
individual suburbs in addition to the historical disparities between
central cities and suburbs.
In Confronting Suburban Poverty in America, researchers Elizabeth
Kneebone and Alan Berube document the spread of poverty in
American suburbs.88 According to the authors, while poverty rates
remain higher in cities and rural areas than in suburban communities,
poverty grew at a faster rate in the suburbs over the course of the last
thirty years.89 This clearly pre-dates the Great Recession; however, it
was the Great Recession and one of its instigators, the housing crash of
2006, that fueled suburban poverty to its current calamitous state.90 The
most rapid growth took place in the 2000s, with the latter half of the
2000s representing twice as much growth as the first half.91 The net
result is that, today, there are more poor people living in the suburbs
than in the central cities.92 The authors are careful to explain, however,
that the purpose of their research is not to argue that suburban poverty
is more egregious or challenging than urban poverty.93 Instead, their
goal is to identify the ways in which suburban poverty and urban
poverty are distinct—and illustrate the need for new and different antipoverty measures.94
The economic crisis hit the poor and economically marginalized the
hardest: theirs were the first jobs to disappear, the first rents to rise, and
the first homes to be foreclosed.95 Suburban poverty’s higher growth

88. KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41.
89. See id. at 17–20.
90. Id. at 39–41.
91. See id. at 40–41.
92. Emily Badger, The Suburbanization of Poverty, CITYLAB (May 20, 2013),
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/05/sburbanization-poverty/5633/, archived at http://perma.c
c/TU92-UABR (noting that 16.4 million poor people live in the suburbs compared to 13.4
million in the central cities).
93. KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 31–36.
94. Id. at 96–112.
95. Kelly D. Edmiston, The Low-and Moderate-Income Population in Recession and
Recovery: Results From a New Survey, 98 FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY: ECON. REV. 33, 33, 44
(2013), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/13q1Edmiston.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/H457-XXSC.
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rate is directly connected to the breadth of the economic crisis, which
generated massive losses of service, construction, and manufacturing
jobs throughout the nation.96 Suburban communities suffered these job
losses acutely.97 In addition to the assault against the already poor, the
Great Recession propelled significant numbers of middle and higher
income families from their respective class brackets into the low and
moderate income brackets (LMI)—thereby growing the ranks of the
poor.98 As a consequence, suburban poverty implicates two distinct
populations: (i) poor residents already residing in or moving to
suburban communities from the central cities (the “traditional LMI”),
and (ii) suburban residents who were middle and higher income
suburban families impacted by recession-based underemployment or
unemployment (the “non-traditional LMI”).99 The traditional LMI and
the non-traditional LMI experience poverty differently, as detailed
below through the exploration of their respective labor markets,
employment opportunities, and social networks.
The Great Recession compounded an already-distressed labor
market. The traditional LMI had already been experiencing a ten-year
period of stunted job growth.100
Traditional LMI jobs are
overwhelmingly low-skill and low-paid occupations.101 As compared to
middle and higher incomes, the traditional LMI labor market suffered a

96. See, e.g., KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 38, 42.
97. See also Aaron Wiener, The Post-Recession Homelessness Epidemic, NEXT CITY
(Jul. 21, 2014), http://nextcity.org/features/view/the-post-recession-homelessness-epidemic,
archived at http://perma.cc/PU3A-TFRH (citing National Employment Law Project report
stating that there are 1 million fewer middle-income jobs than before the Great Recession).
98. See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 33, 35 (“LMI families are defined as those with
income below 80 percent of an area’s median income, where the area of reference is either
the metropolitan area in which a given family lives or, for nonmetropolitan areas, the state as
a whole.”); see also, e.g., Allison Linn, Sprawling and Struggling: Poverty Hits America’s
Suburbs, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013, 3:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plainsight/sprawling-struggling-poverty-hits-americas-suburbs-v17404578, archived at http://perma.
cc/EY8B-FWMT.
99. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 1–10; Edmiston, supra note 95, at 33.
Factors contributing to the migration of low-income residents from the central cities to the
suburbs include affordable housing advocacy, less expensive rental housing as a result of the
glut in housing markets that blocked investors from being able to sell newly built homes, the
availability of subprime mortgages, and the “return to downtown/the city” movement that is
pricing low-income residents out of their homes. See, e.g., id. at 48–54; Theresa Everline,
Surviving Suburbia, 27 NEXT AM. CITY 32, 35 (2010).
100. See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 39–40.
101. Id.
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steeper decline in employment during the recession.102 Moreover,
because the Great Recession relentlessly assaulted practically all job
categories, to the extent any traditional LMI positions become available,
they are filled by unemployed but overqualified middle and higher
income workers.103 Thus, even though much of the country is
experiencing at least some sort of anemic economic recovery, practically
speaking, the traditional LMI do not know that the Great Recession has
ended.
Unlike the traditional LMI, the majority of the non-traditional LMI
joined the LMI ranks after the recession officially ended.104 That labor
market also suffered significant losses during the recession.105 Once
unemployed, these workers typically first exhausted their personal
savings, 401(k) savings, credit, and other assets before seeking public
assistance.106 The fact that the non-traditional LMI are more likely to
fill any new job openings over a traditional LMI candidate provides
little relief because these jobs pay lower wages than what successful
candidates used to bring home and do not offer health benefits.107 These
facts, compounded by depleted personal savings, significantly reduce
any opportunities for the non-traditional LMI to regain their former
wealth and ascend out of LMI status—in short, shrinking the middle
class.
Authors Kneebone and Berube argue that the experience of
suburban poverty is different from that of urban poverty, and that the
non-traditional LMI experience poverty differently from the traditional
LMI.108 Regardless of their shared status as suburban residents, both
the traditional LMI and the non-traditional LMI have challenges
navigating poverty in the suburbs because suburban localities are illequipped to fund and participate in poverty alleviation and other social
service programs. The staggering loss of financial aid from state
governments coupled with an increase in poorer residents has severely
strained the public service budgets of suburban local governments—
particularly because these entities were not designed to provide a high

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 40.
See id. at 41.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 52.
See id. at 43.
See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 31–36.
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volume of social services in the first place.109 Four particularly poignant
examples of these limitations are public transportation, public
assistance, charitable relief, and social networks.
The suburbs are notoriously known for their lack of efficient public
transportation.110 For the traditional LMI, this limitation makes cars a
necessity for traveling to work. However, given their limited financial
resources, the traditional LMI are forced to use older model cars that
come with the related maintenance issues—which means that even the
slightest car repair could cause a major financial disruption.111 A second
limitation is the lack of suburban infrastructure to accommodate rising
demands for public assistance, such as food stamps.112 Likewise, because
of the historical focus on poverty in urban areas, traditional sources of
charitable relief are available, if at all, in extremely limited quantities.113
Those programs that do operate in suburban areas are struggling to
serve an exponentially larger need with significantly reduced dollars.114
The limited suburban infrastructure for social services yields a set of
distinct but equally unpleasant outcomes for both the traditional and
non-traditional LMI that are directly impacted by the strength of their
social networks. Caring for one’s child can be grounds for termination,
and a move across town can destroy all existing social networks that
might be able to provide relief to alleviate any of the other scenarios.115
In contrast to the social networks used by the traditional LMI to
navigate their circumstances,116 suburban poverty can be an isolating

109. See Everline, supra note 99, at 34–37.
110. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 60–62.
111. Id. at 60.
112. Id. at 62–66, 91; see also Mike Maciag, Food Stamp Enrollment Still Climbing in
Many States, GOVERNING (July 30, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/f
ood-stamp-snap-enrollment-rates-climb-in-states.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L7FLHPEN (“The number of Americans relying on federal assistance to put food on the table
ballooned to record levels during the recession—more than doubling from just 10 years
ago.”).
113. See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 62–66, 91–95. As we consider new
approaches to poverty alleviation in all communities, it is important to track the impact that
the racialization of poverty has had on both individual and institutional thinking. Charitable
foundations need to re-examine their funding patterns to ensure that they are meeting the
most urgent need and not falling victim to past patterns based on historical perceptions of
poverty. See, e.g., id.
114. Id. at 93–94.
115. See FULLILOVE, supra note 57, at 229.
116. See id.
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experience for non-traditional LMI because of their unfamiliarity with
its challenges.
The recovery period for all LMI families (both traditional and nontraditional) is the slowest among the economic recoveries occurring
across the country—further cementing regional inequities.117 These
challenges are occurring throughout our metropolitan regions without
any comprehensive state or local government response designed to meet
metropolitan regional needs.118 This is because, as explained in the
following section, regional governance in both theory and application
has failed to engage regional inequities.
C. Governance Failings Perpetuate Regional Inequities
As the realm of both the urban and suburban, metropolitan regions
have long been the subject of academic conversations concerning
regional governance.119 The expansion of suburban poverty combined
with ongoing urban poverty brings new relevance and a sense of
timeliness to the regional governance conversation, which is centered on
the question of whether metropolitan regions are better managed
though the individualized efforts of local governments within a given
metropolitan region or by a voluntary cooperative approach shared
among local governments within the same metropolitan region.120 The
former approach is called localism, the latter called regionalism.121
Entrenched as the predominant governing philosophy in America
since the incorporation of the first suburbs, localism defines local
government law and practice.122 Localism describes the autonomous
operation of local governments independently from and irrespective of
each other.123 Regionalism, in contrast, promotes the formation of
formal government entities to manage metropolitan regional
development and to guide fiscal relationships between localities.124 With
very few exceptions, regionalism has always been more idea than
implementable plan.125
This malleability has led scholars and
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 38.
KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 91.
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000).
See id. at 1.
Id.
See Parlow, supra note 21, at 53–55.
Id. at 53.
See id. at 62–63.
See id. at 62, 71–77.
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practitioners from various disciplines to craft a range of regional
governance proposals.126 As notions of regionalism evolved, a new
branch of regionalism developed, appropriately called new regionalism.
Unlike old regionalism, new regionalism seeks to identify new methods
for cooperative land use planning between local governments while
advocating for measures to eliminate the causes of regional inequities
and encourage more efficient fiscal cooperation between local
governments in the same metropolitan region.127 As demonstrated
below, however, as a movement, new regionalism is stunted because it
exists as a set of ideals without a framework for effectuating those
ideals.
There is a deep wealth of well-developed scholarship detailing local
government law and regional governance theories;128 this Article uses
the most salient of those points to advance the new regionalism
conversation. What follows next are descriptions of the theoretical
underpinnings of each of the governance philosophies—localism,129
regionalism,130 and new regionalism131— accompanied by critiques that
demonstrate how each philosophy contributes to regional inequity and
falls far short of meeting the needs of all regional constituents.
1. The Dimensions of Localism
On its face, localism is a seemingly neutral “descriptive and
normative [governance] theory based on a preference for a system of
decentralized, independent local governments and local control.”132
Creations of their states, local governments “are subject to control by
both their states and local constituents”133 and operate in a range of
forms, including cities, counties, townships, and parishes.134 Our 50
states are home to approximately 90,000 local governments with varying
126. See infra Part II.C.2–3.
127. Orfield, supra note 24, at 92; see also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing limitations of
current attempts to regional fiscal cooperation).
128. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 931 (2010); Briffault, supra note 119; Gerald Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L.
REV. 31 (2000).
129. See infra Part II.C.1.
130. See infra Part II.C.2.
131. See infra Part II.C.3.
132. Parlow, supra note 21, at 53.
133. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 8 (6th ed. 2004).
134. See id. at 8–10.
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levels of authority.135 Each of these units is created, authorized, and
expected to act in isolation from its neighboring localities.136 Localists
assert that the decentralized proliferation of our local governments
encourages (i) freedom of consumer choice, (ii) government efficiency
and innovation, and (iii) the preservation of the democratic process.137
As explained below, however, this “fragmented” approach to governing
metropolitan regions is not neutral but actually works counter to
regional equity.138
Arguments supporting localism’s efficiency fall into two categories:
freedom of consumer choice and government efficiency.139 The notion
of freedom of consumer choice is one of the earliest articulations of
support for localism and is credited to the work of Professor Charles
Tiebout.140
Professor Tiebout asserted that local government
fragmentation is ideal for “consumer-voters” who can choose in which
localities to live based on an assortment of available public services, tax
rates, and regulations.141 Accordingly, the desire to recruit affluent
residents and the constant threat of resident exodus keeps localities
competitive and operating at optimal levels of effectiveness because
unhappy residents can (in theory) always move to another locality.142
Thus, localism serves as a constant “check” on the efficiency of local
government activities.143
The argument for government efficiency asserts that local
government operations are superior to those of the federal and state

135. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES AND
GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL
DISTRICTS 5 (2012). As these numbers suggest, local governments substantially affect the
daily lives of their residents while also being significant economic and political actors at state
and federal levels of government. Advocacy organizations such as the National League of
Cities and the United Conference of Mayors provide information about the potential social
and economic impact of cities. See About NLC, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/a
bout-nlc (last visited Dec. 31, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XBP6-64Q4; Organization
Overview, U.S. CONF. MAYORS, http://usmayors.org/about/overview.asp (last visited Dec. 31,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7WJT-NXCD.
136. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 135, at 5.
137. Briffault, supra note 119, at 15–17; Parlow, supra note 21, at 55–58.
138. See infra notes 153–60 and accompanying text.
139. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15.
140. Id. (explaining Tiebout’s model in Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)).
141. Briffault, supra note 119, at 15 (quoting Tiebout, supra note 140, at 417).
142. See id. at 15–16.
143. Id. at 16; Tiebout, supra note 140, at 422.
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governments.144 This superiority stems from the comparatively smaller
size of local governments and their accessibility to residents.
Specifically, the argument asserts that local governments are better
suited to make localized policy decisions that can be specifically tailored
to local preferences and are not overly inclusive of large numbers of
Additionally, because local
unaffected or contrary interests.145
government operations are, by definition, smaller than those at the
federal and state levels, local governments are smaller bureaucracies
that are, in theory, much easier for residents to navigate—thus keeping
residents from exiting.
In addition to government efficiency, local governments are
routinely promoted as being more innovative than their state and
federal counterparts.146 The argument asserts that local governments
are more capable of fostering innovation with respect to policy-making,
small business support and development, and the creative industries
because their smaller size, comparatively speaking, makes it easier for
the general public to navigate.147
Lastly, the value of preserving the democratic process is framed in
the language of increased public participation and civic engagement by
local voters. Supporters of localism assert that it provides residents with
enhanced opportunities for public discourse and localized decision
making because voters are voting on decisions that impact their day-today lives.148 Similar to the arguments about government efficiency, the
smaller size of a local government is thought to enhance the daily lives
of its residents.149
While the attributes of localism discussed above may explain its
endurance, these attributes also coalesce to foster an enduring
exclusivity with respect to which metropolitan residents receive their
benefit. In other words, as outlined below, localism does not promote
144. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 53.
147. See id. at 55–56 (providing health care, gay marriage, domestic partner benefits,
climate change, immigration, minimum wage, and medical marijuana examples); Neil
Westergaard, Denver Rises in Small Business Rankings, DENVER BUS. J. (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:50
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/broadway_17th/2013/02/Denver-rises-in-smallbusiness-rankings.html?s=print (last updated Feb. 8, 2013, 10:14 AM), archived at http://perm
a.cc/46AJ-S7TB.
148. But see Bill Keller, Op-Ed, States Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at A23
(noting who actually votes in local elections).
149. See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 55.
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regional equity but in fact really only works for middle- and upper-class
localities—the “favored quarter.”150 Favored quarter is the term used to
describe those suburban communities that represent only a quarter of a
regional population but experience the greatest amount of economic
prosperity due to imbalances such as being able to use local control to
avoid taking on regional social service burdens.151 A favored quarter is a
regional space that meets the following three conditions:
(1) it captures the largest or a disproportionate share of public
infrastructure investments in the region; (2) it has the region’s
largest tax base and is the area of highest job growth; and (3) it
retains local powers, which it uses in a manner that closes its
housing markets to non-affluent regional workers, thus becoming
“both socially and politically isolated from regional
responsibilities.”152
This systematic regional imbalance is what localism protects and
preserves.
At the most fundamental level, local governments are service
providers tasked with providing traditional public services, such as
police and fire departments, which are essential to residential quality of
life. Localism has historically served both its affluent and middle-class
constituents well by providing these services in the form of funding good
schools, obtaining federal and state funding for public infrastructure,
recruiting commercial retail development, and offering sizeable lots for
single-family housing while restricting the construction of multi-family
housing.153 Because the suburbs were designed to “create an exclusive
quality of life for the emergent middle-class,”154 until now, localism has
historically excelled at protecting its homogenous and affluent
constituent communities from socioeconomic diversity.155 By its very
definition, localism cannot simultaneously provide the same quality of
benefits to all localities, which means that, for poor and working-class
localities and the new suburban poor, localism does more harm than
150. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000).
151. See id. at 1987–88.
152. Id. at 2004 (quoting MYRON ORFIELD, METRO. AREA RESEARCH CORP.,
SEATTLE METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY IN
THE PUGET SOUND REGION 1–2 (1999)).
153. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 60.
154. Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146 (emphasis omitted).
155. See id. at 1145.
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good, to the detriment of the metropolitan region.156 Theoretically,
localism should provide the same opportunities for efficiency,
innovation, and the preservation of the democratic process for all
localities in a metropolitan region. The quality of these opportunities
for poor and working-class localities, however, is not the same as what is
available to middle-class and affluent localities—cementing regional
inequities.157 For example, all public service delivery is not created
equal, and inner-ring suburban localities are not equipped to provide
the public social services to their increasingly poor residents.158 This is
because, regardless of today’s post-recession reality, suburban
infrastructures were designed to “sustain an exclusive quality of life”159
and, intentionally, not to provide public social services.160 The Great
Recession certainly did not create poor and working-class suburbs;
localism, however, does not serve these localities well.
Localism’s dominance in local government law, however, is firmly
grounded in the history of suburban development. As suburban
localities multiplied across the American landscape, they did so offering
escape from urban life as well as the power to exclude any evidence of
it.161
So we must ask ourselves, now that the geography of poverty has
changed, is localism a defensible approach for any community, even
those it formerly served or continues to serve well? This Article
answers that question in the negative; future scholarship, previewed in
Part IV, will detail how regional interest convergence can demonstrate
to localists where their own self-interests are harmed by localism and
where their interests align with regionalists’.
2. The First Generation of Regionalism (Old Regionalism)
The first generation of regionalism, “old regionalism,” is a response
to localism’s system of fragmentation. Regionalism offers a much more
comprehensive scope to metropolitan development. As metropolitan

156. See id. at 1145–46.
157. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the
Benefits and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997).
158. KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 62–66.
159. See Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146 (emphasis omitted). See supra notes 153–55 and
accompanying text for a discussion of local government officials’ perceptions that local, state,
and federal government have shared responsibility for providing community services.
160. See Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146.
161. See id.

2014]

REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE

787

regions grew in scope, regionalism called for the creation of formal
metropolitan government institutions to manage this growth in
coordination with the localities in the region. 162 Supporters argued that
formal metropolitan governments could lead to more efficient land use
planning and development and more comprehensive service delivery
within regions.163 Despite federal studies164 and academic support165
expounding on the benefits of regionalism, the metropolitan
government movement very rarely materialized in practice in the
United States.166
Regionalism’s explicit concern is the improvement of government
efficiency, initially though the creation of new formal regional
government structures.167 Regionalism began as a movement advocating
for the creation of formal government structures to manage
development patterns and promote regional equity.168 The metropolitan
government movement, however, transformed over time as suburban
units of government began to populate the space surrounding central
cities. Instead of advocating for formal regional governments, the
movement began to argue for regional governance.169 “Government”
and “governance” are not synonymous terms. A regional government is
a formal legal structure formed by a state legislature to exercise
authority over a particular subject matter,170 whereas regional
governance refers to voluntary informal cooperative arrangements and
contracting practices utilized by local governments to jointly and
cooperatively manage certain activities within a region.171 There are
only a handful of formal regional government structures in operation in

162. See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi. The regional government
movement began in earnest during the first half of the twentieth century. See id.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (1955).
165. See Symposium, Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Governmental Concepts,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1957).
166. See infra note 172 and accompanying text regarding formal regional entities in
Minnesota and Portland, Oregon.
167. See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at 24–27.
168. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 63–64.
169. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1787,
1831 (2002).
170. See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi.
171. See Frug, supra note 169, at 1787; Parlow, supra note 21, at 62–63.

788

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:763

this country.172
Regionalism advocates now seek “rules and
arrangements that permit, encourage, or require regional approaches to
issues of growth, quality of life, and inequality but that do not destroy
local autonomy.”173 The primary arguments in support of regionalism174
are government efficiency, economic interdependence between central
cities and suburbs, fair share contributions of tax revenue, and the
establishment of a regional economy through regional economic
development.175
The argument that regionalism is the more efficient governance
philosophy stems from the interdependent relationship between central
cities and suburbs. The ever-present disparities between central cities
and suburbs should not suggest that these entities exist in complete
independence of each other. For example, suburban residents still work
in central cities, and many suburban communities still rely on centralcity infrastructures for the provision of certain public services.176
Moreover, domestically, business decisions and strategic planning are
centered on regional analysis.177
172. Portland, Oregon, and the Twin Cities in Minnesota are the two most stable and
lasting attempts at regional government. See Frug, supra note 169, at 1777; see also, e.g., What
is Metro, OREGON METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/what-metro
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J3GL-CC5G; Who We Are,
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://www.metrocouncil.org/About-Us/The-Council-Who-WeAre.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GDN5-CBHT. Portland’s
Metro is the country’s first directly elected regional government, and it manages a range of
issues including transportation and boundaries between urban and rural land. What is Metro,
supra. The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council manages regional economic development
planning, transportation, and housing policy. Who We Are, supra. Some scholars have
speculated that an underlying reason for the implementation and tenure of these entities is
the fact that they are centered in fairly homogenous populations as compared to other regions
in the country. See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 74–75. While this Article does not
advocate for the formation of similar entities, it does advocate for similar equitable outcomes
in other metropolitan regions. As such, the country’s changing demographics bring a new
avenue of study to these entities.
173. Richard Briffault, Beyond City and Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 203 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/beyond-city-and-suburb-thinkingregionally.
174. According to Professor Richard Briffault, the three core components of the
modern argument for regionalism are (i) the region is a “real economic, social, and ecological
unit”; (ii) there is a need for comprehensive regional policies and planning; and (iii) there is a
need for region-level mechanisms capable of formulating and executing regional-wide
perspectives. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 3–6.
175. See, e.g., id. at 15–17.
176. See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
177. See AMY B. DEAN & DAVID B. REYNOLDS, A NEW NEW DEAL: HOW REGIONAL
ACTIVISM WILL RESHAPE THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 21–27 (2009).
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In addition, several studies have established correlations between
central-city income growth and suburban income growth and the
positive impact of such growth on a region’s overall economy.178 The
notion of regional economies has long been on the radar of economic
development professionals,179 with a particular focus on the economic
impact of regional clusters.180 The economic impact of a regional cluster
is under continuous study but not in doubt.181 Domestic business
decisions and strategic planning are centered on regional analysis.182 A
relocating or expanding business, for example, will look to the region to
determine if there is an existing industry cluster that would complement
or compete with its goods and services. In addition, that same business
would assess the region’s transportation infrastructure, the quality of the
available workforce, and the availability of housing for its existing
workforce. The new regional economy has been described as a
“‘network economy’ in which access to many different forms of
networks is critical. These networks may revolve around labor pools,

178. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 13 (citing LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R.
BARNES, ALL IN IT TOGETHER: CITIES, SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS 1
(1993)).
179. See id. at 26–28.
180. A regional cluster exists where the economy is based on multiple complimentary
industries that provide a diverse range of jobs. See Mercedes Delgado, Michael E. Porter &
Scott Stern, Clusters, Convergence, and Economic Performance 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 18250, 2012); see also Joel Kotkin, Greetings from
Recoveryland, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 2010, at 30, 31 (reporting that Raleigh-Durham, among a
few other areas, is a fast-growing location for Silicon Valley-type activity); Kit Eaton, The
Silicon Valleys of the World: The European Edition, FAST CO. (July 24, 2012, 1:35 AM)
http://www.fastcompany.com/1843422/silicon-valleys-world-european-edition, archived at http
://perma.cc/8QLD-MABV (listing Dublin, Berlin, and the Silicon Corridor, Silicon Fen, and
Silicon Roundabout in Great Britain as European versions of the United States’ Silicon
Valley).
181. Regional economies based on a singular industry have suffered. “Rust Belt” is the
phrase used to describe post-industrial cities who have suffered from massive declines in
industry, jobs, and population, although there is some recent anecdotal information to suggest
that some of these cities may be experiencing comebacks. See, e.g., Jonathan Oosting,
Brookings: Metro Detroit Economy on ‘Road to Full Recovery’ After Surviving ‘Great
Recession,’ MICH. LIVE (Dec. 1, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ss
f/2010/12/brookings_metro_detroit_econom.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2010, 12:29 PM),
archived at http://perma.cc/D36G-RFC2 (reporting that Detroit has entered a recovery period
since the 2008 recession); Will Doig, Rust Belt Chic: Declining Midwest Cities Make a
Comeback, SALON (May 12, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/12/rust_belt_chi
c_declining_midwest_cities_make_a_comeback/, archived at http://perma.cc/KQ2Y-JT36.
182. See DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177 at 21–27.

790

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:763

finance, retail, services, ideas, or other areas of expertise.”183 Studies
have also found an interdependent relationship between the economic
health of a region’s citizens and the region’s ability to compete
successfully in the global marketplace.184 Thus,185 regions are domestic
economic actors with the potential to participate in global markets.186
Finally, in addition to the above arguments, there are very practical
reasons for regionalism’s appeal. Metropolitan residents lead regional
lives.187 Residents’ daily activities (including work, shopping, and
entertainment) may involve trips to numerous localities within a region
in any given day.188
Regionalists argue that the independent actions of multiple localities
within a region are incapable of comprehensively addressing regional
issues.189
Because localities plan in isolation from each other,
regionalists argue that this status quo approach, fragmentation, is
economically inefficient and inequitable.190 As independent units with
their own tax bases, localities compete against each other for new
affluent and middle-class residents who will grow their respective tax
bases by deploying a host of fiscal and land use products such as zoning,
eminent domain, and tax incentive programs.191 These incentives,
however, further intensify regional inequities.192
Despite its more comprehensive approach, regionalism still falls
short of promoting regional equity. As explained below, the majority of
regional activities performed by local governments are governed by

183. See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 508
(2005).
184. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 35–36. But see Briffault, supra note 119, at
13–14 (explaining that the argument that regions compete in the global marketplace is
controversial).
185. The idea of a regional role in the global economy is more aspirational than the
domestic analog. Social scientists, economists in particular, predict a role for regions as global
economic actors but acknowledge that the capacity is not there yet except in a handful of
regions such as Silicon Valley in northern California. See Kotkin, supra note 180, at 32;
Michael S. Malone, Why Silicon Valley Will Continue to Rule the Tech Economy (Aug. 22,
2014, 6:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-malone-why-silicon-valley-will-continueto-rule-the-tech-economy-1408747795, archived at http://perma.cc/8HV7-YTA9.
186. See Griffith, supra note 183, at 510.
187. See Briffault, supra note 173.
188. See, e.g., id.
189. See id.
190. See Griffith, supra note 183, at 509; see also Briffault, supra note 173.
191. See Briffault, supra note 173.
192. Id.
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informal, voluntary arrangements.193 The two most frequently employed
mechanisms of regional governance are intergovernmental cooperative
agreements194 and special purpose districts.195 The widespread use of
these mechanisms is not suited for ameliorating regional inequities,
however, and the flawed design and implementation of these
mechanisms actually contribute to regional inequality.196
State laws generally permit municipalities and local governments to
contract with each other through cooperative agreements for shared
services and the collection and distribution of taxes.197 These regional
service-sharing agreements typically govern costs and use for services
such as police and fire departments, public transportation, waste
treatment, airports, sports arenas, and convention centers.198 While it is
quite common practice for localities to voluntarily enter into these
agreements for the mutual benefit of their respective citizens, these are
not comprehensive schemes of regional governance.199 First, the scope
of these agreements is typically too narrowly defined or otherwise too
limited to make any impact on regional inequities.200 For example,
scopes of service are limited to discrete topics such as water, policing, or
waste removal, whereas, in contrast, regional governance agreements
rarely govern more comprehensive equity issues such as affordable
housing efforts.201 Second, because these agreements are voluntary, they
lack any stringent mechanisms for oversight or accountability.202 The

193. See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
194. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the
New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 119–32 (2003) [hereinafter Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation].
195. See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW.
483, 498 (2007) [hereinafter Reynolds, Local Governments].
196. See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 123.
197. See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 496.
198. See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2030.
199. See id. at 2028–30.
200. See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 120–32, 137.
201. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 68, at 666–67 (discussing regional contribution
agreements for affordable housing in New Jersey); Rachel Fox, The Selling Out of Mount
Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 535 (1988) (discussing regional contribution agreements for affordable housing in
New Jersey); see also Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849 (2011) (chronicling the
series of Mount Laurel court decisions and the effects of their current application on
affordable housing issues in New Jersey).
202. Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 127.

792

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:763

consequence of this is that there is no regional-level mechanism that
monitors the execution or breach of these agreements. Finally, these
agreements are not designed to curb existing inequities between
communities.203
In fact, scholars have argued that cooperative
agreements actually exacerbate regional inequalities because only
similarly situated municipalities are parties to the agreements.204 Thus,
even if they contract with each other, less affluent localities do not
benefit from this mechanism because of their limited resources.
The creation of special purpose districts is a second approach to
attempting some form of regional governance. On average, each
metropolitan region hosts 100 general purpose and special purpose local
governments.205 As the name suggests, general purpose governments
exercise authority over a large range of subject areas, such as land use,
public safety, health, and transportation.206 In contrast, special purpose
districts are delegated very limited scopes of authority207 and are formed
typically to exercise narrowly defined powers over entities such as sports
While special purpose
stadiums or transportation authorities.208
governments are not uncommon, they are not inherently regional by
design.209 In fact, some scholars have argued that special purpose
entities are so widely used precisely because these entities yield no
regional impact.210 Their narrow focus limits their authority to one
issue, prevents any sort of coordinated effort with other entities, and
makes them less susceptible to political entreaties.211 These entities deal
with “things regionalism” rather than “people regionalism.”212 In other
words, special purpose entities are not intended to address “lifestyle
issues like housing, education, and social equity.”213

203. See id. at 116, 128.
204. Professor Laurie Reynolds argues that intergovernmental agreements have “nontrivial” anti-regional effect. Id. at 98.
205. STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi.
206. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 133, at 11.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 498.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 512 (discussing regional special districts).
212. Id. at 516–17 (quoting HENRY G. CISNEROS, REGIONALISM: THE NEW
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 8–9 (1995)).
213. See id. at 516 (quoting Donald F. Norris, Prospects for Regional Governance Under
the New Regionalism: Economic Imperatives Versus Political Impediments, 23 J. URB. AFF.
557, 561 (2001).
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Neither intergovernmental cooperative agreements nor special
purpose districts are properly designed to alleviate regional inequities.
After all of these decades, why has regionalism not been accepted as a
viable option to localism? Regionalism has failed to garner significant
grassroots support214 because, in large part, it is an abstract concept.
This is not just the result of a poorly executed marketing strategy,
meaning it is not simply a matter of regionalists’ having a good product
that they are not communicating properly about. It is also about the
product, or rather, the lack of an identifiable outcome and a focus
instead on too many undefined outcomes. Once regionalism moved
away from advocating for formal regional government structures to
advocating for informal regional governance structures, it unwittingly
opened the door to countless mechanisms and proposals to effectuate
informal regional governance. It is hard to get grounded in or feel
connected to a movement that has no solid tactical foundation.
Numerous articles have been written to propose new forms of regional
governance structures or legislation.215
Despite these proposals,
however, regionalists have done a poor job of communicating with
specificity what regionalism has to offer. As a result, regionalism has
experienced a series of theoretical and practical failures, which are
structural and direct by-products of localism’s successes. These include
the failure to garner broad political support of, or at least key political
figures capable of exercising political will in support of, regionalism; a
persistent lack of momentum on the ground; the failure to deliver a solid
framework for implementation; and the failure to communicate to
localists the shared benefits of regionalism and where their self-interests
are aligned.216 Regionalism’s informal attempt to address equity
concerns with governance morphed into what is known as the new
regionalism movement.
3. New Regionalism’s Unfulfilled Promise
Recognizing the limited appeal of formal regional government
entities, regionalism advocates adjusted their strategic position to adopt
a “new regionalism.”217 This new regionalism hearkens back to the
underlying principles of the metropolitan government by seeking to

214.
215.
216.
217.

See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2037.
See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 68.
See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15–17; Parlow, supra note 21, at 70–77.
See Griffith, supra note 183, at 509–10.
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serve the wider social and economic needs of all regional residents.218 It
marries these equity principles to the use of informal and voluntary
governance mechanisms that preserve local government autonomy.219
This Article does not present a new type of governance school of
thought.
Instead, recognizing the limitations in that area and
acknowledging that many good ideas have been proposed that are yet to
be tested, this Article proposes a strategy for revitalizing the dormant
new regionalist movement to achieve regional equity.
New regionalism is an interdisciplinary reform movement that
promotes regional governance and regional equity.220 The movement
materialized in planning literature in the 1990s as a response to the
unchecked growth of regional inequities.221 Although a succinct
definition of new regionalism has yet to evolve, “key elements” include
a place-based focus on planning, crafting a “response to the problems of
postmodern metropolitan regions,” a holistic approach to regional
planning, retooling existing physical planning practices, and passionate
advocacy.222 “New regionalists advocate measures to reduce growing
inequality, discourage the detrimental fiscal competition between local
governments within a metropolitan region, and remove fiscal barriers to
cooperative land use planning.”223 The movement seeks to respond to
the current tension in the regional governance conversation concerning
the feasibility of and desire to achieve equitable delivery of local
government services and cure other regional inequities while respecting
local government autonomy.224 Instead of a formal metropolitan

218. See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2027.
219. See id.
220. See Stephen M. Wheeler, The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an
Emerging Movement, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 267, 267–74 (2002).
221. See id. at 267, 269.
222. See id. at 270–71 (title case removed); see also Reynolds, Intergovernmental
Cooperation, supra note 194, at 113 (listing efficiency, economic interdependence,
participatory democracy, and equity as the four criteria that underlie the new regionalist
movement).
223. Orfield, supra note 24, at 92.
224. See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2028. Despite the moniker, new regionalism is not
an entirely new concept, and, notwithstanding its stated platforms, there is no universal
description of the new regionalist movement. Frug, supra note 169, at 1786–87; see also
Wheeler, supra note 220, at 270. “In fact, rather than a cohesive ideology with a wellaccepted policy agenda, New Regionalism refers more precisely to shared concerns and goals
for metropolitan area equity.” Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at
112. “It is hard to pin down exactly what new regionalism is.” Frug, supra note 169, at
1786−87.
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government, new regionalists advocate for a form of regional
governance, created through cooperation and collaborative efforts,
seeking to implement governance mechanisms that have regional impact
as opposed to regional authority while advancing regional equity.225
To a large extent, the new regionalism movement is suffering from
the same inertia that doomed the metropolitan government movement
discussed earlier.226 This is because much of the conversation concerns
what goals new regionalism should achieve to the exclusion of how to
achieve those goals227 and, to the extent such mechanisms exist, they are
not structured in ways that promote regional equity. It is too simple
(but not inaccurate) to say that new regionalism has a branding
problem. New regionalists promote regional equity but not directly in
the communities for which it is promoted. A reform movement without
a strategy is an academic concept, and new regionalism has largely
remained an academic ideal instead of becoming a grassroots
movement—which is a missed opportunity. New regionalists hold
fundamental the notion that all elements of a region—cities, suburbs,
and green space—are connected and should not be treated in isolation
from each other.228 The movement, however, has not articulated any
strategies or crafted any political campaigns to achieve its loosely
defined goals.229 It is missing an implementable strategic plan. Regional
interest convergence is such a strategy.
Although each governance philosophy has strengths and
weaknesses, this Article argues that a new regionalist governance
philosophy offers the optimal governance theory for metropolitan
regions because it offers a workable balance between governance
interests. The new regionalist movement has been missing a strategic
framework to facilitate its actual implementation, and this Article
presents regional interest convergence as such a framework.

225. See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2027–28.
226. See supra Part II.C.2.
227. But see Cashin, supra note 150, at 2036–41 (proposing grassroots coalition building
and the smart growth movement as concrete examples for achieving new regionalism).
228. Griffith, supra note 183, at 509.
229. See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 490; see also Griffith, supra
note 183, at 509–10.
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III. TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE:
INTEREST CONVERGENCE
As explained, the new regionalist movement is missing a substantive
implementation strategy. As detailed in Parts III and IV, regional
interest convergence can fill this gap. What makes this possible is the
reconceptualization of interest convergence as a transaction—an
exchange for value between regional constituents.
This Article
accomplishes that by introducing an interest convergence methodology
for use as a strategic tool of reform and as a framework for problem
solving. To provide the appropriate context for the methodology, it is
important to first review the evolution of the interest convergence
theory in legal scholarship, particularly its uses as legal strategy.
A. Interest Convergence Theory
Professor Derrick Bell first articulated the interest convergence
theory in a 1980 Harvard Law Review article.230 The article was a
response to Professor Herbert Wechsler’s criticism of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark public
school desegregation case.231 Professor Wechsler critiqued the decision
as lacking in neutral principles, meaning he believed that the Supreme
Court did not reach its decision as an “exercise of reason” but as an
exercise of its will by treating segregation in public schools as a matter
of discrimination instead of freedom of association.232 Thus, while
Professor Wechsler himself did not personally object to the outcome of
the case, he accused the Court of mischaracterizing the issue to achieve
the desired outcome.233 Professor Bell countered the idea that the case
was wrongly decided by using the interest convergence theory as a lens
to explain the decision.234 As Brown concerned the nation’s separate
230. Bell, supra note 27. Professor Derrick Bell was a well-respected constitutional law
scholar and pioneer of critical race theory scholarship. The interest convergence theory is
arguably one of Professor Bell’s most important legacies. Not only is it a pillar of critical race
theory scholarship, but it has also been applied in a host of other legal scholarship genres and
as a way to elucidate unequal bargaining power and divergent interests. See DERRICK BELL
OFFICIAL SITE, http://professorderrickbell.com/tributes/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/84V-G7SD.
231. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Bell, supra note 27 (discussing
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959)).
232. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 520.
233. Wechsler, supra note 231, at 32–34.
234. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524.
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systems for educating black and white children, Bell identified the
relevant interests in the case (and as representative of interests
throughout the country) as those belonging to blacks and to white
elites.235 Specifically, Professor Bell argued that the Court’s decision
was the manifestation of the convergence of the interests of white elites
and blacks.236 Professor Bell described the interests of blacks in Brown
as wanting to achieve racial equality through desegregated schools, and
the interests of white elites as being beyond the immorality of racial
inequality237 and extending to reputational concerns about counteracting
Communism domestically (particularly in the black community) and
internationally, reassuring black Americans about the country’s
progress towards racial equality, and removing segregation as a barrier
to the industrialization of the South.238 He concluded that the Court
reached its decision because the interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality through desegregated schools did not conflict with those
interests of white elites.239 In other words, the interests of blacks seeking
racial equality through the desegregation of public schools converged
with the very different interests of white elites who viewed the
desegregation of America’s public schools as a means to the end of
protecting the country’s international reputation on race matters,
stemming Communism, and maintaining a sense of domestic calm.240
Regional interest convergence is a reconceptualization of the
interest convergence theory, a theory designed to explain the
circumstances under which the interests of subordinated peoples are

235. See id. at 523–25. It is important to note that the “white” interests represented the
interests of white elites, which adds a very interesting class dimension to the analysis. Poor
whites were outraged by the outcome of Brown. See id. at 525–26; see also Derrick Bell,
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003) (applying the interest convergence
theory to explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
approving Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program in its admissions process). See
infra Part IV for a discussion of how regional interest convergence contemplates class.
236. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–24.
237. Id. at 525. In fact, Professor Bell argued that white interest in racial equality would
not have been enough to motivate the decision. Id.
238. Id. at 524–25. Professor Bell notes that there were whites who recognized that
segregation was inhibiting economic development. See id.
239. Id. at 523. “[T]his principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of whites.” Id.
240. See id. at 523–25.
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advanced.241 Many scholars perceive the theory as a particularly
pessimistic view of race relations in America because it asserts that the
interests of a subordinated group will not advance until those interests
align with the interests of the majority group and the alignment does not
alter the majority’s status quo.242 Some might therefore question this
Article’s reference to the interest convergence theory to promote
regional equity, particularly because, unlike the interest convergence
theory, this Article does not position the advancement of regional
equity on the maintenance of any group’s status quo. This Article
instead takes the position that interest convergence has the potential to
be a dynamic tool for identifying and aligning the myriad interests in
metropolitan regions because it explicitly contemplates the positions of
subordinated peoples, a necessary factor in any equity analysis.243 This
Article reconceptualizes the interest convergence theory and highlights
the theory’s unique suitability for navigating power dynamics in
metropolitan regions by identifying and aligning interests across a
metropolitan region to promote regional equity without regard for the
maintenance of any regional constituents’ status quo.244
B. Interest Convergence Methodology
Several notable legal scholars have employed interest convergence
theory to discuss a range of social inequities and cultural phenomena.245
These scholars have broadened the application of the interest
convergence theory by crafting derivative theories of convergence to
analyze group dynamics and to advocate for reform.246 Similarly, this

241. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV
149, 150–51 (2011).
242. See Cashin, supra note 26, at 254–55. See also infra notes 246–64 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the optimistic frame of the transactional approach.
243. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
244. This application of interest convergence in a transactional context diverges from
Professor Bell’s original articulation of the theory. See supra notes 230–40 and accompanying
text.
245. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 26.
246. See, e.g., infra notes 244–52 and accompanying text; see also Cashin, supra note 26;
Michèle Alexandre, “Love Don’t Live Here Anymore”: Economic Incentives for a More
Equitable Model of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2008) (exploring
interest convergence between city officials and private developers to incorporate the interests
of the “economically vulnerable” in redevelopment projects). For a detailed list and analysis
of articles exploring the interest convergence theory in legal scholarship, see Driver, supra
note 241, at 152 nn.17–18 (critiquing Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory). See also
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Article also presents a new derivative theory of interest convergence.
This Article, however, explores the interest convergence theory from a
transactional perspective and proposes interest convergence as a
strategy for reviving the new regionalist movement and advancing
regional equity.
Professor Cynthia Lee writes that interest convergence has
applications as both an “explanation” and a “tool of strategy or
prediction.”247 Interest convergence as “explanation” is demonstrated
when legal scholars use the theory to explain specific judicial decisions,
judicial trends, and legislative enactments.248
Professor Bell’s
articulation of the theory to explain Brown is the archetype of this
application.249
Interest convergence as a “tool of strategy and
prediction” speaks to legal scholars’ deployment of the theory to
advocate for reform in various subjects.250 For example, Professor Lee
uses interest convergence theory as the foundation for her theory of
cultural convergence, which offers a normative theory for predicting
when cultural evidence will be successfully used by defendants in
criminal trials.251 Cultural convergence is “the idea that the interests of
minority and immigrant criminal defendants in obtaining leniency seem
most likely to receive accommodation when there is a convergence
between dominant majority cultural norms and the cultural norms relied
upon by the immigrant or minority defendant.”252 According to
Professor Lee, cultural convergence theory can be an explanation for
Stephen M. Feldman, Do The Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248 (2012) (critiquing Professor Driver’s critique).
247. Lee, supra note 28, at 925, 933. For example, Professor Catherine Smith employs
interest convergence theory as an organizing strategy to promote what she coined “outsider
interest convergence.”
Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest
Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2008). Professor Smith argues that subordinated
groups should use interest convergence theory to build coalitions with each other as
“outsiders” to the majority by identifying “what are perceived to be white middle class,
heterosexual norms and the subordinated groups’ respective group’s failures to conform to
those norms serve to marginalize each group and all groups in the coalition.” Id. at 1089. For
Professor Smith, interest convergence theory is a tool that subordinated groups should use to
find shared concerns and commonalities in order to strengthen their collective power and
facilitate interactions with the majority. See id. at 1089–90.
248. See Lee, supra note 28, at 925–32.
249. See Bell, supra note 27.
250. See Lee, supra note 28, at 933 (presenting four categories of legal scholarship that
treat interest convergence theory as strategy or predictive of the success of that strategy:
workplace reform, educational reform, political reform, and other reforms).
251. See id. at 914.
252. Id. at 913–14.
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why some defendants may be more successful than others in defending
their criminal cases.253 In other words, when immigrant and minority
defendants are successful with the deployment of cultural evidence in
their defense, it may be because they have cultural norms that are
similar to or in alignment with the norms of our dominant culture.254
This is an example of employing interest convergence theory as a tool
for prediction. Professor Lee’s approach highlights a quintessential
point about the interest convergence theory—it is not an answer but a
device by which to illuminate possible answers, explanations, strategies,
and predictions.255
The feasibility of the interest convergence theory as the explanation
for the outcome in Brown is certainly subject to debate. Professor Bell
himself acknowledged that the white interests he identified in Brown
might “seem insufficient proof of self-interest leverage” to explain
Brown, given the importance of the decision, but that those interests,
nonetheless, help assess the decision.256 Professor Bell’s analysis
presents a set of criteria that can be normalized and replicated to
promote interest convergence in other contexts, specifically, for the
purposes of this Article, the new regionalist movement.257 This Article
distills the interest convergence theory into its component elements to
formalize an interest convergence methodology and applies interest
convergence in the context of local government law from a transactional
perspective.258 As such, regional interest convergence serves as a novel
application of interest convergence from a transactional perspective in
the local government context.
Transactional law focuses on creating value for the various parties to
a transaction.259 Interest convergence theory has overwhelmingly been

253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 939–58.
256. Bell, supra note 28, at 525.
257. See id. at 523–25.
258. Cf. Jonathan C. Augustine, The Interest Convergence of Education Reform and
Economic Development: A Response to “The State of Our Unions,” 51 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 407 (2013) (writing about the convergence of economic interests to improve public
education).
259. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 244–56 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost
Engineers (Working Paper No. 147, 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=11418,
archived at http://perma.cc/8PMZ-GP3M.
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examined in a litigation- or rights-based context.260 This Article
proposes that “interest convergence operating in a transactional context,
facilitates sustainable alignments between distinct sets of interests and
that these alignments are fluid and would be responsive to changes in
interests over time.”261 While litigating rights-based controversies has
undoubtedly secured fundamental rights for subordinated groups, that
approach can produce a framework for myopic and narrow analyses of
those interests.262 Transactional practice, in contrast, is a collaborative
process.263 Instead of one party seeking value at the expense of another,
all parties to the transaction typically expect some sort of exchange of
value.264
The methodology below presents Professor Bell’s analysis of the
facts and outcome of Brown to identify the criteria for navigating an
interest convergence question.265 The elements of the methodology are
as follows: multiple constituent groups, one of whom is subordinated or
represents a subordinated interest;266 distinct interests held by each
constituent group; at least one method of convergence; and an actual
resulting convergence that does not downgrade the status quo of the
dominant party.267

260. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
261. Patience A. Crowder, Interest Convergence as Transaction?, 75 U. PITT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7) (on file with author).
262. See John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2215–16
(1992).
263. ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERING PRACTICE 4 (2013).
264. Id.
265. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33.
266. See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text for a discussion about whether,
excluding Brown, subordination is a requirement for all interest convergence questions.
267. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33.

802

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:763

Table 1
Brown Interest Convergence Methodology
Multiple
Constituent
Groups
Multiple
Interests

Subordinated
Constituent
Group/
Type of
Subordination
Medium for
Convergence
Resulting
Convergence

White Elites

Blacks

Protect the United States’
international reputation
concerning race relations;
curtail the spread of
Communism in the black
community; and remove
segregation as a barrier to
industrialization in the
South.

Equal access to
public
education
(desegregation)

Blacks/Race
and
Non-elite Whites/Class268

Blacks/Race
and
Non-elite
Whites/Class

U.S. Supreme Court

U.S. Supreme
Court

Desegregation while
preserving status quo of this
constituent group

Desegregation

268. The specific exclusion of the interests of low-income whites is a second form of
subordination presented by Brown. See id. at 525–26.
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1. Multiple Constituent Groups
An interest convergence transaction requires multiple constituent
groups. Professor Bell constructed the interest convergence theory
around the interests of black and elite white Americans.269 He made it a
point to explain that poor white Americans were vehemently opposed
to public school integration,270 and their interests were not considered by
the Court.271
2. Multiple Interests
An interest convergence transaction requires at least two distinct
sets of interests. According to Professor Bell, the interests of white
elites centered on America’s international reputation for being a
country of tolerance; foreclosing the spread of Communism, particularly
in the black community; and removing the economic barriers to
industrialization that were being structurally maintained by segregation
in the south.272 The interests of blacks, in comparison, centered on
achieving racial equality through the desegregation of public schools.273
It is important to understand that the interests in an interest
convergence transaction do not have to mirror each other or even be
similar for a convergence to occur. As explained further in Part IV, the
interests must be capable of being aligned. In Brown, the interests of
blacks in desegregated schools as a function of “equality of individual
opportunity”274 aligned with the interests of white elites to facilitate the
Court’s decision to desegregate public schools.275
3. Subordinated Party/Type of Subordination
Interest convergence was designed to explain convergences of
interest between multiple parties, where one party was subordinated in
some respect to the other.276 Brown was decided at the beginning of the
civil resistance campaigns of America’s Civil Rights Movement, a social
movement dedicated to eradicating formal systems of race
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 525.
See id. at 525–26.
Id. at 523–25.
Id. at 529.
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 112 (2d ed. 2012).
275. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524–25.
276. See id. at 523.
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discrimination in the United States and lessening the impact of informal
discriminatory practices.277 Thus, blacks were the subordinated group in
Brown and the type of subordination was racial discrimination,
specifically with respect to segregation in public schools.278
4. Medium for Convergence
An interest convergence transaction requires a medium for
convergence.279 In Brown, the Supreme Court was the method of
convergence. While the Court’s decision does not explicitly state that it
considered each of the interests identified by Professor Bell, there is
evidence that the parties raised these or similar issues in their respective
briefs in addition to other forms of circumstantial evidence.280
5. Resulting Convergence
An interest convergence transaction has an outcome.281 In Brown,
the Court’s decision to desegregate America’s public schools was the
resultant interest convergence.282 Desegregation was formally outlawed,
which met the interests of white elites in preserving America’s
international reputation on race relations, appeasing blacks and
stemming Communism in the black community, and opening access to
quality public education in the South with the goal of industrializing the
South.283 This outcome met the interests of both blacks and white elites
without, as Professor Bell noted, altering the status quo of white elites.284
Distilling the interest convergence theory down to its basic elements
permits a reconceptualization of the theory’s import and application.
This reconceptualization is appropriate because, to date, scholars have
277.
278.
279.
280.
also Lee,

See WILSON, supra note 274, at 112–14.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Bell, supra note 27, at 528–29.
See Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1); see
supra note 28 at 922–24 (citing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR RIGHTS: RACE
AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90–102 (2000) (discussing Mary Dudziak’s
book Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, in which Dudziak
detailed archival records that substantiated Bell’s assertion that Brown was a Cold War
reaction—validating his interest convergence theory)).
281. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523.
282. See id. at 524; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
283. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–25.
284. This Article deviates from Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory on this
point. As explained in Part IV, regional interest convergence does not require the majority
party’s status quo to remain unchanged to facilitate the convergence. See infra notes 322–25
and accompanying text.
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explored interest convergence theory in litigation-based contexts.285
This reconceptualization demonstrates that, on a most fundamental
level, interest convergence can be a type of transaction between
multiple parties (here, regional constituent groups) which creates a
space for the implementation of regional interest convergence as a
transaction for pursuing new regionalism in regional planning.
IV. REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE:
A NEW REGIONALISM REVIVAL
As I have argued in other scholarship, interest convergence can
serve as a transactional framework for bringing value to different
constituent groups.286 In that vein, regional interest convergence is a
transactional strategy that could reboot the new regionalism movement
and revive it by activating new regionalism’s twin goals of equity and
efficiency.287 Using the nomenclature of local government law, this
section identifies regional constituents and their interests that are ripe
for convergence; introduces the regional interest convergence
methodology; and outlines mechanisms to effectuate regional interest
convergence. The vignettes below depict scenarios of two different
types of metropolitan communities and demonstrate where the interests
of these regional constituents can converge.
A Tale of Two Communities
Although it didn’t start that way, life in Townedge Park288 has been
hard for generations. Originating as a working class neighborhood in
the late nineteenth century, today, it is known as the untouchable
neighborhood—the “hard hood.” A community surrounded by industry
and where people without choice or options end up. Depending on who
you ask, it may be the poorest community in the city; it certainly is one
of the poorest in the state. It is the neighborhood of last resort, where
no one moves to voluntarily but finds a way to call it home once they are
there. It is approximately 1,500 people surrounded by a Central City of
almost 500,000. It is a community where close to 90% of the housing is
public or subsidized low-quality housing; where the median annual
household income is $8,000; where the median rent is $174; where 82%

285.
286.
287.
288.

See, e.g., Lee, supra note 28, at 925–33.
See Crowder, supra note 261.
See Tyson, supra note 25, at 302.
Townedge Park is a hypothetical neighborhood in a central city.
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of the population lives below the poverty level (compared to 22% of the
surrounding city); where over 90% of the adult women in the
community commute outside of it for work in a service industry; and
where the overwhelming majority of residents are people of color and
immigrants. It is a poor inner-city community and its struggles have
isolated it from other communities in the city.
In comparison, since its formation as a suburb of Central City, dayto-day life in Groveland is markedly different from the daily experiences
in Townedge Park.289 This is despite the fact that the communities are
less than fifteen miles apart. It incorporated as a suburb in the 1940s to
form part of the emerging metropolitan region and existed as an idyllic
community for decades. Over the years its population grew steadily but
modestly to close to 85,000. Its leadership worked to preserve a certain
quality of life in Groveland by steadfastly focusing on promoting the
construction of single-family homes and recruiting national commercial
chains. Within four years of the housing crisis and the Great Recession,
one in every eighteen homes was foreclosed. Today, it is a community
of single-family homes, of two-car garages, and where the median
household income used to be $89,000 and the unemployment rate sat at
3%. Today, unemployment is 9%. The construction and manufacturing
jobs that had historically sustained Groveland and similar suburbs
across the nation disappeared. Formerly an affluent community,
Groveland now has struggles similar to those in Townedge Park.
Not so long ago, the differences between these two communities
could not be starker; today, however, they share striking commonalities
that present profound opportunities for change in regional planning and
poverty alleviation programs.
The application of regional interest convergence to regional inequity
is particularly appropriate because, as discussed in Part III, the origins
of interest convergence theory lie in identifying mechanisms by which
subordinated groups can advance their cause.290 The strategy is also
relevant given the history of race and class discrimination in the
evolution of our metropolitan regions.291 The growth and development
of metropolitan regions cannot be fully understood nor can the
persistent advancement of regional inequity be remedied without
recognizing the intersection of race and class discrimination that
289. Groveland is a hypothetical suburb of a central city.
290. See supra notes 276–85 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part II.A.
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sustained the suburbs for decades. Exclusive by design, the proliferation
of the suburbs was fueled by racial and economic segregation that
confined the majority of blacks to central cities to contend with a range
of social ills, including concentrated poverty.292 This, unsurprisingly, led
to a correlation between race and poverty that that persists today.293
Efforts to alleviate poverty throughout metropolitan regions have to
take this race and class dynamic into account to reach their optimum
level of effectiveness.
Otherwise, systematic problems will go
unaddressed.
A. Regional Constituents
Metropolitan regions house a diverse range of individual,
community-based, and institutional residents, and, as such, are home to
a diverse range of regional constituent groups, each with its own
respective interests. In the regional governance vernacular, there are
two predominant, but unequally situated, regional constituent groups:
regionalists and localists.294 These are not political parties. These labels
are shorthand for an approach that a regional constituent would support
to protect its space and interests in the region. Regionalists advocate for
mechanisms of regional governance to conceive of, manage, and
develop metropolitan areas as regional spaces.295 Localists champion
the autonomy of independent local governments as the appropriate
form of regional management.296 Scholarship on local government law
and regional governance has not recognized areas for the convergence
of interests between regionalists and localists. This Article presents
regional interest convergence as a framework that can facilitate that
convergence by identifying and squaring the amorphous limits of new
292. There is an extensive literature about the well-documented patterns of
discrimination that supported the exclusivity of the suburbs. See generally MARY PATTILLO,
BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY (2007); RUSK,
supra note 38; ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003); RAY SUAREZ, THE OLD NEIGHBORHOOD: WHAT WE LOST IN
THE GREAT SUBURBAN MIGRATION 1966–1999 (1999).
293. See, e.g., Ian Haney López, Is Paul Ryan Racist?, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2014), http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/is-paul-ryan-racist-104687_full.html?, archived at
http://perma.cc/W2JF-2X8R (discussing politics and the racialization of inner-city poverty). It
is worth noting that the non-traditional members of the LMI population are typically not
minorities and tend to have more education than the traditional LMI population. Edmiston,
supra note 95, at 53.
294. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 1.
295. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 52.
296. Id. at 53.
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regionalism.297 As explained below, regional interest convergence
makes these limits functionally effective through the identification of
regional constituent groups and their interests and by providing a
convergence mechanism for aligning those interests.298
1. The Localists’ Autonomy Interest
As previously explained, localism is currently the dominant
governance construct in metropolitan regions.299 Succinctly stated,
localism is “about the legal and political empowerment of local areas.”300
Localists, therefore, seek to preserve and protect the current system of
multiple “relatively small governments wielding power over such critical
matters as local land use regulation, local taxation, and the financing of
local public services.”301 As a system that celebrates the independence
of localities, localism is supported by a range of individual and
institutional actors.302 These individual and institutional actors are what
I identify as the first of the two regional constituent groups identified in
this Article: the localists. The localists constituent group consists of
suburban local government leaders, residents of affluent suburbs,
business and industry entities,303 real estate developers,304 institutions of
higher education, and, in many cases, central-city officials.305 The
members of the localists constituency have varying reasons for their
preference but are united in their ideology of decentralized power in
regional spaces.306 The members of the localists constituent group
297. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
298. See infra notes 311–15 and accompanying text.
299. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 51.
300. Briffault, supra note 119, at 2.
301. Id. at 1.
302. See id. at 2.
303. See id. While business and industry may have strategic regional plans to guide
their growth and development, these entities interact with local governments on a variety of
significant matters that include recruitment, relocation assistance, and tax incentives.
304. See JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 8.1 (Supp. 2014).
305. Despite the concerns of inner-city communities with equity, central-city leadership
is included in the localist constituent group because many of these leaders typically view
autonomy as the way to maintain the influence of the central city (or at least its internal
power structure). See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 119, at 28–29 (“Central city officials and
residents who would benefit from some forms of regionalism, such as tax base sharing, might
be leery of regional initiatives that seem to threaten the autonomy of their communities or
weaken their political voices.”).
306. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 53. The localists interest of autonomy has two distinct
strands: autonomy and equity. In other words, there are two subsets of localists—those who
value autonomy for the sake of autonomy and those who value autonomy as a means for

2014]

REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE

809

typically occupy a privileged position in regional spaces—a position that
has historically been well-maintained by localism.307 While the earliest
arguments for localism were clothed in the language of “public choice”
to preserve the localist values identified in Part II,308 today’s dominant
justification is articulated as “autonomy”309—the autonomy to control
land use, tax rates and the distribution of tax revenues, and the delivery
of municipal services.310 Thus, for the purposes of the regional interest
convergence methodology, the localists interest is autonomy. “Choice”
and “autonomy” are seemingly innocuous terms, but we know from the
history of metropolitan regional development that they can be used as
proxies for race and class discrimination.311 Because regional interest
convergence requires the identification and alliance of interests, it has
the potential to move beyond such pretexts and guard against
discrimination.
2. The Regionalists’ Equity Interests
Regionalists “call for new regional processes, structures, or
institutions that can identify regional problems, formulate regional
solutions, implement those solutions, and coordinate regional actions
over a wide range of policy domains.”312 The second group of regional
constituents I have identified is the regionalists. The regionalists

achieving regional equity. I call these two subsets autonomy–localists and equity–localists,
respectively. Equity–localists want the same equitable outcome for regional residents as the
regionalists, but believe that is best achieved through local governments. See supra Part
II.C.1. For example, equity–localists such as Professor Gerald Frug believe that cities are
hamstrung by limitations set by their state governments and that increased autonomy would
enhance community participation as well as the governing and decision-making powers of
municipal bodies. See Frug, supra note 169, at 1789–90. While all localists value autonomy,
the identity of the equity–localists differs from the identity of the autonomy–localists.
Equity–localists are the minority viewpoint in the localists constituency and tend to be
academics and social scientists as opposed to individuals with economic or political power to
effectuate change (unlike autonomy–localists who are generally the parties residing in or
otherwise protective of the “favored quarter”). See Cashin, supra note 150, at 1987. Neither
autonomy–localists nor equity–localists are satisfied with the current level of power held by
local governments and believe that local governments need more autonomy through
increased powers delegated by the states. See Frug, supra, note 167, at 1789–92; see also
Briffault, supra note 119, at 28–29.
307. See supra notes 149–60 and accompanying text.
308. See Frug, supra note 167, at 1764 & n.3; see also supra Part II.C.1.
309. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15, 17–19.
310. See MARTINEZ, supra note 304.
311. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 24–25.
312. Id. at 6.
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constituent group consists of a wide range of subgroups that includes
working class and low-income communities (regardless of race or
ethnicity); residential communities of color (regardless of class);
immigrants; residents of inner-ring suburbs; central-city residents;
nonprofit and other charitable organizations; social justice
organizations; and new regionalists.313 These are the groups that have
historically been affected, either directly or indirectly, by racial and class
inequities.314 As such, it should not be a surprise that, for the purposes
of the regional interest convergence methodology, their interest is
equity. Regional equity seeks equal access to opportunities that
decrease income gaps within a region and remove barriers to regional
construction of affordable housing and the creation of good jobs that
pay living wages.315 The animation of the new regionalism movement,
however, requires the strategic acknowledgement that equity is not the
primary interest of all regional constituents. To navigate regional
interest convergence, I have identified two predominant regional
constituent groups: localists and regionalists. What follows is an
explanation of the regional interest convergence methodology.
B. Regional Interest Convergence Methodology
This section introduces the regional interest convergence
methodology.316 Like the interest convergence methodology, the
313. See, e.g., supra notes 79–80, 348–50 and accompanying text.
314. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 69.
315. See Parlow, supra note 21, at 69–70.
316. It is important to note that these constituent groups are archetypes of the two
governance theories. These are not monolithic categories but expansive labels that represent
several subcategories of regional constituents. It is certainly possible that an affluent home
owner could have regionalists sympathies despite her class status. Likewise, it is also possible
that a working class resident of an inner-ring suburb could have localists sympathies despite
her class status.
This Article is focused on interest convergence between the localists and regionalists
constituent groups; however, it is important to recognize that each regional constituent group
is comprised of subset groups whose interests must be recognized before regional interest
convergence can be deployed as a new regionalist strategy. In other words, the localists and
regionalists constituent groups must each undergo a micro-interest convergence of the
interests of their respective subsets. Because each constituent group represents multiple
subsets of interests, the interests of localists and regionalists must be intra-aligned via a microinterest convergence within their respective constituent groups before cross-aligned between
localists and regionalists. As such, this Article argues that three types of interest convergence
are required to move towards new regionalist governance: (1) micro-interest convergence
among regionalists, (2) micro-interest convergence among localists, and (3) macro-interest
convergence between localists and regionalists. Again, this Article is focused on the
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regional interest convergence methodology contemplates the following
elements: multiple constituent groups; distinct interests held by each
group; a subordinated interest; a method of convergence; and a resulting
convergence.317
Both of the methodology charts demonstrate a
transactional perspective that brings to light new and intriguing
commonalities between the interests identified in Brown and those of
the localists and regionalists constituent groups. Specifically, the charts
reveal that the underlying interests in the Brown and regional interest
convergence methodologies are similar. The chart below makes what
was implicit in Brown explicit—that equity and autonomy questions
were at the center of Brown.318 The equal access to public education
interest of blacks in Brown is fundamentally a question of equity—a
question of equal access and opportunity in public education.
Unfortunately, this remains a social and political challenge and is one of
the current platforms of today’s regional equity movement. Similarly,
the reputational interests of white elites in Brown are fundamentally a
question about autonomy, albeit reputational autonomy and selfgovernance as opposed to formally designated local government
autonomy prevalent throughout metropolitan regions today. White
elites in Brown wanted control over how the world perceived America’s
race relations.319 Today, localists want to maintain local control in
regional spaces.

convergence of localists and regionalists interests. An analysis of micro-interest convergence
must be undertaken in future scholarship; however, there is support for this idea in Professor
Bell’s work. Micro-interest convergence occurred among the white elites in Brown as
evidenced by the arguments in the amicus briefs. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524; see also
supra note 280 and accompanying text. Similarly, blacks in Brown underwent micro-interest
convergence through community organizing. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524. The
identification of micro-interest convergence as a necessary step for regional interest
convergence is a nuanced discovery. It is important because it names and and normalizes the
interest convergence methodology, thus making it an accessible and replicable strategy for
subordinated groups. See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, Towards Interest Convergence: Coalition
Building Requires Connection Within as Well as Without, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 205 (1997).
317. Supra Part III.B.
318. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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Table 2
Comparison of Brown Interest Convergence and Regional Interest
Convergence Methodologies
Brown Interest Convergence

Constituent
Groups
Interests

White Elites
Protect America’s
international
reputation
concerning race
relations; curtail
the spread of
Communism in
the black
community; and
remove
segregation as a
barrier to
industrialization in
the South.

Blacks
Educational
equality.
This interest
in public
education
represents a
core
component of
the modern
regional
equity
movement.

Regional Interest
Convergence
Regionalists

Localists

Equity in
access to
opportunity,
including
public
education,
affordable
housing,
employment
opportunities,
and economic
development.

Autonomy of
local
governments.

Blacks/Race
and
Poor
Whites/Class

Blacks/Race
and
Poor
Whites/Class

These interests
reflect the
simultaneous
autonomous
interests of white
elites in both
managing the
world’s perception
of America in race
relations and
managing their
own sense of
happiness with the
state of the
country’s
development.

Subordinated
Constituent
Group and
Type of
Subordination

Blacks/Race
and
Poor
Whites/Class

Blacks/Race
and
Poor
Whites/Class

Method of
Convergence

Supreme Court

Regional Organizing Through
Interest-Based Negotiation

Resulting
Convergence

Desegregation

Regional Equity
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1. Multiple Constituent Groups
Like in Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates two
constituent groups: localists and regionalists.320 Regional interest
convergence, therefore, will occur between the localists and regionalists
constituent groups.
2. Multiple Interests321
As in Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates two sets of
interests, each held by a regional constituent group: autonomy, valued
by localists,322 and equity, valued by regionalists.323 The interest

320. See supra Table 2.
321. As explained in note 311, each regional constituent group should undergo a microinterest convergence within itself to facilitate regional interest convergence between the
localists and regionalists constituent groups. See infra note 316 for an outline of these microinterest convergence mechanisms.
322. The literature discussing interest convergence is not limited to legal scholarship.
Political scientists have also employed interest convergence mechanisms to explain or predict
certain outcomes. See Stacy Bondanella Taninchev, Intergovernmental Organizations and
Interest Convergence: Does Issue Area Matter? (Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Sept. 1−4, 2011, Seattle, W.A.), available at http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1901961, archived at http://perma.cc/8CT6-5UV6.
Institutional socialization is a form of micro-interest convergence that institutional localists
can undergo before effectuating regional interest convergence. See generally David H.
Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and MemberState Interest Convergence, 61 INT’L ORG. 703 (2007). Of particular relevance to this Article
are convergences of institutional interests, which are the interests of the institutions that have
a demonstrated regional impact. In a paper analyzing state behavior in international
relations, Professor Stacy Bondanella Taninchev explains that “greater interaction” within an
institution “leads to greater interest convergence over time.” Bondanella Taninchev, supra,
at 3. This form of interest convergence is institutional socialization. See id.
Institutional socialization describes the phenomenon that occurs when independent
members of a singular institution show greater convergence of interest over the course of
time because of the frequency of contact between the members. See Bearce & Bondanella,
supra at 703. It speaks to the value of social interaction among representatives from various
institutions who are collectively housed by one umbrella institution to find shared interests.
Institutional socialization is crucial to achieving interest convergence across and within
diverse institutions. Given the range of institutional and individual members of the localists
subgroups, there are different types of micro-interest convergences that can occur within the
localist constituent group. Institutional interests are particularly prevalent in the localists
constituent group. See Briffault, supra note 119, at 22. Specifically, a type of micro-interest
convergence that institutional localists can undergo before effectuating regional interest
convergence is institutional socialization. See Bearce & Bondanella, supra, at 723.
Institutional socialization explains the informal process by which the attitudes and
behaviors of independent actors are integrated over the course of their interaction within the
same institution. See Bearce & Bondanella, supra, at 706. In other words, it is likely that the
interests of individuals who repeatedly interact with each other under the auspices of the
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convergence theory teaches that the constituents’ interests need not be
the same for a convergence to occur.324 These two sets of interests are

same organization will integrate over the course of time. This is true even despite the fact
that their respective work in the organization is as a representative for another entity (as is
the case with regional councils of government discussed below). This would be a microconvergence within the localists constituent group.
323. Engaged and effective multi-racial and class-based coalitions are essential to the
revival of new regionalism. Interest group convergence is the mechanism by which to form
these coalitions and is the micro-interest convergence for regionalists necessary to facilitate
regional interest convergence. The phrase was first coined by Professor Sheryll Cashin, who
crafted the phrase to describe her advocacy for a process to encourage racial minorities to
coalesce around their similarities and exercise collective political power in pursuit of shared
interests that impact each group in the coalition for the ultimate purpose of “achieving
progressivity through interest group convergence.” See Cashin, supra note 26, at 256, 265,
273−74 (coining “interest group convergence”).
Professor Bell’s theory of interest
convergence explains an outcome produced when two parties’ interests align despite the fact
that one of the parties is subordinate to the other. In contrast, Professor Cashin’s theory of
interest group convergence explains an alignment of similarly situated groups. See id. at
272−75. These groups are the subgroups that comprise the regionalist constituent group; like
the localists, regionalists must undergo an in-group micro-convergence to facilitate regional
interest convergence. See supra Part IV.A.2.
In developing this theory, Professor Cashin advances the idea of employing interest
convergence as a strategy—specifically a political strategy—and she argues that interest
convergence theory is the appropriate strategy for forming multi-racial coalitions to challenge
racial inequalities and champion progressive legislation. See id. at 268–291. Relying on
political science literature, Professor Cashin identifies the following four preconditions as
requirements for viable multi-racial coalitions:
(a) the recognition by the parties involved of their respective self-interests; (b) the
mutual belief that each party stands to benefit in terms of that self-interest from
allying with the other or others; (c) the acceptance of the fact that each party has its
own independent base of power and does not depend for ultimate decision-making
on a force outside itself; and (d) the realization that the coalition deals with specific
and identifiable—as opposed to general and vague—goals.
Id. at 270 (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 79–80 (1967)). Specifically, Professor Cashin argues
that a “convergence of interests among communities of color, working class[es], and
progressive whites” could lead to a more effective progressive coalition. Id. at 255. In
making her argument, she reviews the tensions that have historically and are currently
challenging multi-racial coalitions and explains that determining whether individual groups
are more motivated by ideology or interest is the most challenging hurdle to the formation of
multi-racial coalitions. See id. at 278–81. Professor Cashin defines “ideology” as “the preexisting opinions and attitudes of a particular racial group toward another group.” Id. at 278.
She defines interest as “the recognized tactical or strategic advantage that one racial group
can gain by forming a coalition with another group.” Id. Regional organizing is the most
effective method for overcoming self-interests and accomplishing interest group convergence.
See infra notes 326–29 and accompanying text.
324. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524–25.
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distinct from each other and, as detailed below, capable of being
aligned.325
3. Subordinated Party/Type of Subordination
As did Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates both race
and class discrimination, as documented through the story of
metropolitan development.
4. Medium for Convergence: Regional Organizing Through InterestBased Negotiation
An interest convergence transaction needs a medium to manage the
actual convergence of interests and to formalize the result. In Brown,
the Supreme Court was the medium for convergence.326 In regional
interest convergence, as explained below, a possible medium for
convergence is regional organizing through an interest-based
negotiation framework327 for the purpose of creating regional alliances
around equity issues.
Regional organizing is the extension of community organizing
beyond neighborhood boundaries to connect similarly situated people
throughout a metropolitan region.328 “It is not clear . . . that our
metropolitan policyscape can be changed without a base that can
consistently challenge and not just mollify elite decision-makers.”329
Regional organizing efforts seek to build regional coalitions among lowincome and diverse communities by “scaling up” local organizing
efforts.330 As a primary tool of the regional equity movement, regional
325. This Article diverges from Professor Bell’s assertion that interest convergence can
only occur if the dominant party’s status quo remains unchanged.
326. See supra Table 1.
327. See infra notes 327–49 notes and accompanying text for a discussion of interestbased negotiation.
328. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 10.
329. See id. at 44. In accordance with the three strands of the regional equity movement
discussed earlier, regional organizing has employed a multi-faceted approach based on three
variants of regionalism: community development regionalism, policy reform regionalism, and
social movement regionalism. See id. at 24. “Community development regionalism has as its
focus the use of regional tools to achieve particular projects.” Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
Policy reform regionalism focuses beyond neighborhood boundaries on changes in
metropolitan policy. See id. Social movement regionalism views regionalism as “a vehicle for
doing politics.” Id.
330. “Metropolitan organizing is about changing the rules of the game so that those who
have not, will have. . . . Metropolitan organizing is the new civil rights movement.” See id. at
15 (quoting Rev. Cheryl Rivera) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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organizing looks beyond “leveraging regional dynamics for [singular]
project development” but focuses instead “on how the region itself
might become fertile ground for an entirely new scale of power-building,
complete with broader implications for policy and political change.”331
The regional equity movement is a reform movement that “includes
policies and practices to promote and manage regional economic growth
in a way that maximizes benefits for residents of low-income
communities of color throughout metropolitan regions.”332
The
movement seeks to build equity concerns into existing local government
laws and economic development practices to eradicate regional
inequities.333 Although the regional equity movement originated outside
of the scope of the regional governance debate, local government law
and equitable economic development policy and practice are the legal
and normative standards underlying the regional equity movement.334
Therefore, it is important to identify intersections between these
movements to build broader coalitions and maximize support.
Like the new regionalist movement, the regional equity movement
began in the 1990s when “social justice advocates recognized the role of
the metropolitan development patterns in maintaining and exacerbating
racial and economic disparities in income, wealth, health, and
opportunity.”335 Like new regionalism, the regional equity movement
holds that the region is the most appropriate political forum for
developing and implementing new regional equity strategies to address
existing regional inequities.336 Fused with market sensitivities, the
movement is an amalgamation of past social justice movements that is

331. See id. at 10. There are gradations of regional organizing. For example, in his
book American Metropolitics, Myron Orfield argues that central cities and inner-ring suburbs
should form “metropolitan coalitions” to overcome the power of the “favored quarter”
wealthy suburbs. See ORFIELD, supra note 32, at xii. For a discussion of the three elements
of regional power building, see DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177, at 85–158 (listing the
three elements developing a regional policy agenda, forming deep coalitions, and political
action).
332. Angela Glover Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 IND. L. REV. 1273,
1278 (2001).
333. See id. at 1278–81.
334. See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 116.
335. ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL & SARAH TREUHAFT, POLICYLINK, REGIONAL
EQUITY AND THE QUEST FOR FULL INCLUSION 2 (2008), available at
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/REGIONALEQUITY_QUEST_FOR_INCLUSI
ON_FINAL.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/V3LE-U9L2.
336. See id.
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built around analytic, practical, and political components.337
Analytically, the regional equity movement asserts that our
metropolitan development patterns need to change because these
patterns are responsible for our “most challenging urban problems.”338
The movement’s practical elements consider the limitations of past but
outdated successes and assert that disparities in housing, economic
development, and workforce development require “new metropolitan
strategies” that should be “more effective at generating equitable
outcomes than either traditional community development efforts or
broad national policy.”339 Lastly, the political component asserts “that
the region is a productive place for new progressive organizing, partly
because it is on the regional scale that many problems are experienced
and partly because a confluence of interests make it possible to create
new sustainable coalitions among unlikely partners.”340 The regional
equity movement presents a comprehensive framework for
implementing regional interest convergence.
In their book This Could Be the Start of Something Big, social
scientists Manuel Pastor, Chris Benner, and Martha Matsuoka trace the
progress of regional organizing and determine that the most
fundamental element necessary for effective regional organizing is the
identification of links between day-to-day experiences within the region
and specific equity issues.341 The absence of such links has been a
challenge for new regionalism since its inception.342 “Sometimes the link
is not explicitly to ‘regional equity’ as a vision or a goal but rather to
specific issues of opportunity or inequality that happen to have regional
dimensions.”343 Such links prevent the movement from appearing too
abstract and distant from ‘real’ community issues.

337. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 3.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 170. In addition, successful regional organizing campaigns demonstrate
“common themes of power analysis, leadership development, and community organizing.”
See id. at 15.
342. Id. at 170–71.
343. Id. at 171. These links can also serve to raise a “regional consciousness” or
“metropolitan identity,” particularly if it is true that, while people may pledge devotion to
cities, states, and the nation, there is no such allegiance for regions. For most people,
“regional identity” is an academic concept. See Briffault, supra note 173. This is despite the
fact that the daily lives of most people extend beyond the locality in which they live, including
the places where they work, shop, visit friends and family, and are entertained. See id.
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Regionalism cannot be imposed as an external solution—and
when presented as an abstract concept, it frequently carries little
sense of immediacy in people’s lives. Thus, it does not serve as a
mobilizing force. Nor are academic discussions of regional
policies . . . necessarily compelling; such conversations tend to
launch conferences, not social movements. By contrast, in those
efforts that are contributing to building a social movement,
regionalism is not perceived as an external concept or abstract
notion. Instead, using popular education based on sophisticated
research and analysis, regional equity organizers can
demonstrate how regional strategies can bring community and
individual aspirations to life.344
Interest-based negotiation is an answer to the question of how to
practically approach coalition building among regional constituents. It
is one thing to say that regional community coalitions are an important
force in addressing regional poverty; it is another to document how
those coalitions can form and successfully interact with local
government structures. As a multidimensional challenge, regional
inequity is particularly suited for interest-based negotiation.
“Multidimensional problem-solving refers to the breadth of issues
relevant to both the negotiation process and outcome, and the fact that
they will be perceived differently by the stakeholders depending on their
own perspectives, interests, and objectives in the negotiation.”345
Negotiation specialists have identified four steps to completing a
successful interest-based negotiation for multidimensional interests: (i)
revealing interests, (ii) enlarging interests, (iii) enlightened interests,
and (iv) aligning interests.346 Because interest-based negotiation skills
344. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 173.
345. Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn & Eric J. McNulty, The Walk in the Woods: A
Step-by-Step Method for Facilitating Interest-Based Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,
NEGOTIATION J. 337, 339–40 (2012). “Problem solving may be unidimensional [(me for me)],
two-dimensional [(me against you)], or multidimensional.” Id. Unidimensional and twodimensional negotiators employ classic “adversarial conflict.” Id. at 340. This means that the
negotiators are focused on “triumphing” over the opposing party by learning their
vulnerabilities and developing strategies to exploit them. Id.
346. Step one, revealing interests, requires the parties to reveal their interests by
identifying and articulating what they “hope or need to gain or achieve in the negotiation.”
Marcus, et al., supra note 345, at 342. During this step, the parties are instructed to listen
actively and to talk to each other in a nonadversarial fashion with the goal being that the
parties will achieve self-awareness and appreciate the interests of the other party. Id. The
second step, enlarging interests, requires the parties collectively to list points of agreement
and disagreement. Id. at 343. This process helps highlight commonalities and enlarge
interests. Id. Step three, enlightened interests, is facilitated by the discussion that occurs
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are centered on identifying and meeting the underlying needs of all
parties involved in a negotiation, these negotiation practices dovetail
nicely with the transactional application of interest convergence
methodology.347 The principal attributes of interest-based negotiation
are “stakeholder interaction” and “bargaining that is based on mutual
interests and overlapping objectives” to achieve “a mutually beneficial
solution.”348 Interest-based negotiation skills serve to counteract power
imbalances between the parties. This is particularly important for
marginalized communities seeking to interact with local governments.349
To date, lawyers have employed interest-based negotiation techniques
in transactions and disputes involving private parties.350 The suggestion
here is that interest-based negotiation might be deployed as a large-scale
grassroots effort for regional alliance building, particularly through the
work of the nonprofit organizations such as those listed below.351
Nonprofit organizations such as PolicyLink352 the Advancement
during step two. See id. at 344. Step three is an “exploratory and creative brainstorming
process” that encourages “creative problem solving and [allows parties] to practice mini-deal
making.” Id. The parties rank the list of ideas generated during the brainstorming session by
a value system that indicates the level of agreement between the parties (e.g., 1 could
demonstrate total agreement). Id. at 345. Each idea is individually discussed, and, after the
first ranking, the “maybes” are discussed to determine if these issues can be bumped up to
show total agreement or bumped down to show total disagreement. Id. Step four, aligning
interests, “is the conclusive bargaining phase.” Id. Here, the parties finalize the deal. Id.
“Ultimately, such negotiations result in a deal because each party has achieved enough
recognizable gain: they each ‘get’ something. What they each get certainly does not need to
be identical, and it does not need to be of equal monetary value; it is gauged by the relative
value it has for each stakeholder.” Id. at 346.
347. See, e.g., Jim Hilbert, Collaborative Lawyering: A Process for Interest-Based
Negotiation, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1083 (2010); see also supra Part III.B.
348. Marcus et al., supra note 345, at 339, 340.
349. Roger Fisher and William Ury are widely credited with being the first to articulate
principles of interest-based negotiation in their book Getting to Yes. See generally ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (using the phrase “principled negotiation” instead of
“interest-based negotiation”). Scholars such as Richard Abel have argued that negotiation is
an informal mechanism for justice that increases state control over the disempowered. See
Richard L. Abel, Introduction to 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 1, 6, 11 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Here, interest-based negotiation in the
service of regional interest convergence is envisioned to be an exercise in grassroots
advocacy. See id.
350. See Marcus et al., supra note 345, at 338–39.
351. See infra Part IV.C.
352. Mission Statement, POLICYLINK, http://www.policylink.org/about/mission-statemen
t (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6MT-4U5H (“PolicyLink connects
the work of people on the ground to the creation of sustainable communities of opportunity
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Project,353 the Gamaliel Foundation,354 and Strategic Concepts in
Organizing & Policy Education (S.C.O.P.E),355 serve regional organizing
missions and are working to build coalitions that cut across class, ethnic,
racial, and ethno-religious differences.
These organizing efforts,
however, are not without challenges. To date, activists have had more
success building broadband coalitions around singular equity issues
(such as living wage campaigns and black and brown coalitions among
African American and Latino youth) but have had less success building
coalitions that run throughout the equity issues contained in a region.356
Interest based negotiation frameworks could work with adjustments to
current practices that facilitate implementation for coalition-building
negotiations, but that inquiry deserves full attention in future
scholarship. “Addressing metropolitan policy requires that groups
develop new and different sorts of technical capacities; and shifting
policy and political aim from the neighborhood to the region requires a

that allow everyone to participate and prosper. Such communities offer access to quality jobs,
affordable housing, good schools, transportation, and the benefits of healthy food and
physical activity.”)
353. Mission, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.advancementproject.org/pages/mis
sion (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) , archived at http://perma.cc/4FFL-UN2P. (“Advancement
Project is a next generation, multi-racial civil rights organization. Rooted in the great human
rights struggles for equality and justice, we exist to fulfill America’s promise of a caring,
inclusive and just democracy. We use innovative tools and strategies to strengthen social
movements and achieve high impact policy change.”).
354. About Gamaliel, GAMALIEL, http://www.gamaliel.org/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
Jan. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H8AQ-KZMT; see also Gamaliel, ROCHESTER
ALLIANCE COMMUNITIES TRANSFORMING SOC’Y, INC. (ROC/ACTS), https://sites.google.co
m/site/rochesteracts/gamaliel (last visited Oct. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4JZAZQJJ (“Gamaliel is a grassroots network of non-partisan, faith-based organizations in 17 U.S.
states, South Africa and the United Kingdom, that organizes to empower ordinary people to
effectively participate in the political, environmental, social and economic decisions affecting
their lives. . . . Gamaliel provides leadership training, helps build community organizations,
and leads local and national social justice campaigns.”).
355. Our Mission, SCOPE, http://scopela.org/about-us/mission-history/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/77AN-7Q2C; see also Juliana D. Norwood, SCOPE’s
Novel Approach to Bringing Neighborhood Organizations Together, OUR WEEKLY L.A.
(Oct. 17, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://ourweekly.com/news/2012/oct/17/scopes-novel-approach-tobringing-neighborhood/, archived at http://perma.cc/BRA5-5N4T (“Strategic Concepts in
Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE) builds grassroots power to eliminate the
structural barriers to social and economic opportunities for poor and disenfranchised
communities. SCOPE combines community organizing, leadership development, strategic
alliance building, research, training and capacity building, and policy advocacy to pursue its
mission at the local, state and national levels.”).
356. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 148.
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leap of faith that can be difficult to sustain.”357 As such, something out
of the ordinary is required to advance regional equity. As an animator
of the new regionalism movement, regional interest convergence
provides that opportunity for the extraordinary. New regionalism is the
bridge between regionalists and localists, and as demonstrated in the
Venn diagram below, regional interest convergence facilitates that
alliance. Until now, there has been no strategy to capitalize on this
alignment of interests. Now that regional constituents and their
interests have been identified, the next section will briefly discuss the
practical application of regional interest convergence.

357. Id. at 14.
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C. Resulting Convergence: Regional Interest Convergence in Practice
The convergence methodologies uniquely chart paths to coalition
building. In Brown, the resulting interest convergence was the Court’s
holding to desegregate public schools.358 Interest convergence theory
holds that this occurred because of the alignment between the interests
of blacks and white elites.359 As a new regionalist strategy, regional
interest convergence holds that the resulting convergence of an
alignment of the interests of localists and regionalists can advance
regional equity while maintaining local government autonomy.360 While
the goal of this Article is not to maintain any constituent’s status quo,
it’s worth noting that, to some extent, regional interest convergence
preserves local government autonomy because it does not depend upon
the creation of any new state legislative avenues for its
implementation.361 However, the advancement of regional equity must
necessarily impair localism’s ability to exclude residents from affluent
communities because “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”362
Barriers to regional equity can, therefore, be challenged by using
interest-based negotiation to mount effective regional organizing
campaigns to align the interests of localists and regionalists and promote
regional interest convergence. Regional interest convergence can
incentivize the behavior of members of constituent groups who have
misperceived their self-interests as opposed to those who intentionally
discriminate based on race or class.363
To attempt to alleviate metropolitan poverty, it is important to
develop poverty alleviation mechanisms for both urban and suburban
communities.
As a new regionalist strategy, regional interest
convergence is designed to meet the needs of both of these communities
because it forces the identification of each regional constituent’s

358. See Bell, supra note 27, at 524; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954).
359. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests in
Brown.
360. See supra Table 2.
361. See infra Part IV.B.
362. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
363. See, e.g., Daniel Coleman, Rich People Just Care Less, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at
SR12 (reporting on research that people with “the most social power pay scant attention to
those with little such power”).
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interest, including the interests of both urban and suburban
communities.
Ultimately, for a regional equity movement to capture the
national imagination fully and contribute to a revitalization of
progressive politics around the country, the varying
constituencies need to develop a closer communication and
coordinating structure throughout the country. They need to
build on the telling moments of social combustion—starting at a
local and regional scale with the modest epiphanies that come
when city dwellers and suburbanites reach out to each other
about more sustainable development, when the working poor
and the middle class see a common fate resulting from economic
insecurity, and when blacks, whites, Latinos, Asians, and others
find identity not only in their ethnicity but also in their regional
or community connections.364
This section identifies mechanisms that can serve as conceptual
anchors for regional interest convergence efforts. Each of these should
be explored in future scholarship; however, here they generally fall into
one of the following categories: economic development, regional
planning, and strategic partnerships between community groups and
business. Each of the anchors would appear in the blended section of
the Venn diagram on page 821 and is briefly outlined below. It is
helpful to identify rationales for regional interest convergence that
explain its capacity to work for the benefit of both localists and
regionalists—demonstrating why either regional constituent would want
to participate in regional interest convergence.
[T]he political challenge of regionalism in any form is to show
middle- and lower middle-class voters in suburbs with low and
declining property tax values that their interests converge with
central cities, that tax base sharing will improve their services
while lowering their tax taxes, that it will restrict their fair
housing commitments to regional standards, and that it will
stabilize their communities against further decline.365

364. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 215.
365. Troutt, supra note 68, at 1175.
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The answers to this challenge lie in the nation’s rapidly changing
demographics and in communities such as Ferguson, Missouri.366
The country is projected to become majority-minority by 2044.367
With these demographics shifts in population will come shifts in
attitudes about class and race that will make the facilitation of regional
interest convergence easier to navigate as we move farther and farther
away from the black/white dichotomy,368 and the country will suffer in
the global marketplace if the majority of its young workforce is
underprepared and undereducated for the existing job market.369 Also,
while it might seem alarmist to point to Ferguson, Missouri, as a
harbinger of things to come, decades of class and race discrimination
have produced an untold number of communities like Ferguson, where
the poor population doubled and the unemployment rate was over 13%
between 2010 and 2012.370 Regional interest convergence can serve as a
tool to build regional alliances among communities like Ferguson to
strengthen their social and political power within a metropolitan region.
Both localists and regionalists would benefit from regional interest
convergence efforts in economic development activities, particularly
those aimed at distressed cities in metropolitan regions.371 Distressed
cities are those that are financially insolvent but have not yet declared

366. Daniel J. McGraw, Ferguson: Race and the Inner-Ring Suburb, BELT MAG. (Aug.
14, 2014), http://beltmag.com/ferguson-race-inner-ring-suburb/, archived at http://perma.cc/U
N36-5KGP.
367. SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND
COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 9 (2015), available at
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf; see
also McGraw, supra note 366.
368. Although this will undoubtedly bring other challenges. See, e.g., Cashin, supra
note 150.
369. In today’s labor market, most good jobs require a higher education. See Four
Reasons to Use the Equity Frame in Your Campaign, BOLDER ADVOCACY BLOG (April 15,
5:24 PM 2014), http://bolderadvocacy.org/blog/4-reasons-why-equity-is-the-superior-growthmodel-for-the-nation-and-3-ways-to-implement-equitable-growth, available at http://perma.cc
/LWH8-DUG4. In two decades the majority of all young American workers will be people of
color; however, only 28% of black and Latino workers, 15% of Latino immigrants, and 24%
of Native Americans and Alaskan natives have an associate’s degree. See id.
370. See Elizabeth Kneebone, Ferguson, Mo. Emblematic of Growing Suburban
Poverty, BROOKINGS, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2014/08/15-fergusonsuburban-poverty (Aug. 15, 2014, 2:30 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/8A6D-585V.
371. Distressed cities are cities that have not declared bankruptcy but are in an acute
struggle for economic stability. See Liz Farmer, Distress Signals, GOVERNING, Mar. 2014, at
42, 44.

2014]

REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE

825

Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.372 While currently on the rise in some
parts of the country, property values plummeted across the nation
during the housing crisis, shrinking the value and volume of property tax
payments received by state and local governments.373 These entities
responded in various ways, with state governments undergoing dramatic
organizational changes to address record budget short falls.374 In
addition to cutting back on social services, many state governments are
delegating responsibilities to local governments without providing
additional financial resources.375 Localities, in turn, have been forced to
explore extreme measures to address their current state of financial
instability376 as the citizenry of numerous states and localities have been
rocked by battles over public pension funds.377 Because the economic
stability of localities varies in accordance with a locality’s available tax
base, the loss of state aid and tax revenue impacts localities within the
same region differently—intensifying regional disparities and increasing
the number of localities in distress.378 There is a shared sentiment
372. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014);
Farmer, supra note 371.
373. See supra notes 60, 191 and accompanying text.
374. For example, California is in the process of dissolving more than 400 of its
redevelopment agencies due to budget constraints. See Maura Dolan, Jessica Garrison &
Anthony York, Court Deals Costly Blow to Cities, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at A1. Other
states have severely reduced employment in state-wide public services such as public
education. See Dennis Cauchon, Public Workforce Slashed at Local Level: 5 States Account
for Majority of Losses, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2010, at 1A.
375. Local governments are losing access to significant financial resources from their
state governments. See Alan Greenblatt, The Hand-Off, GOVERNING, Apr. 2011, at 24, 24.
376. For example, cities such as Richmond, California; Irvington, New Jersey; and
North Las Vegas, Nevada have explored the feasibility of using eminent domain to slow the
rate of home foreclosures. See Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2013, at A1. In Richmond, where almost half of the city’s homeowners
with mortgages owe more than the home’s current worth, the city proposes to purchase these
loans at fair market value, write down the debt, and allow the homeowner to refinance the
mortgage at more favorable terms through partnerships with government programs or
nonprofit organizations. See id. According to the proposal, if the city’s offer to purchase is
declined, it will then use eminent domain to obtain the loan. See id. Not surprisingly, the
banking and real estate industries oppose these sorts of proposals, which is somewhat ironic
given their support of the use of eminent domain during the urban renewal heydays. See id.;
Justin Yurkanin, Mortgage Relief Plan in North Las Vegas Ignites Morality Debate, LAS VEGAS
REV. J. (Jul. 14, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/multimedia/mortgage-reliefplan-in-north-las-vegas-ignites-morality-debate.
377. The most infamous to date is the City of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing. See, e.g.,
Rana Foroohar, Broken City: How Detroit’s Epic Bankruptcy Could Help the Rest of the
Country, TIME, Aug. 5, 2013, at 22.
378. See supra notes 60, 191 and accompanying text.
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among localities that “[t]he federal government has all the money, states
have all the power and cities have all the problems.”379 When the first
suburbs were formed, cities relied on property taxes as the main source
of revenue for funding public services.380 That model has been in
decline for decades and a suitable replacement has yet to be
discovered.381 As a result, cities are contemplating a host of austerity
measures that are particularly focused on service delivery but could
impact their neighboring suburbs as well. Suburban communities,
including affluent communities, need to be vested in the economic
health of their central cities
Because regional planning is largely an advisory activity that
requires the voluntary participation of localities, regional interest
convergence efforts in regional planning should revolve around
incentive programs. Current federal funding practices for community
and economic development programs are fertile ground for regional
interest convergence. One program that is particularly relevant is the
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program.382 This
program rewards applications for funding that demonstrate regional or
multijurisdictional impact. This is because localists and regionalists
interests converge where the goal is federal funding for affordable
housing and community and economic development programs.383 Many
formerly affluent suburban communities are confronting challenges in
their boundaries ranging from economic harms associated with
foreclosed and abandoned homes384 to the emerging suburban single
family rental housing market, which is becoming increasingly tight and
being driven by investment firms that are bundling and securitizing the
rent payments.385 Innovative regional planning through regional interest
convergence would promote regional affordable housing plans and the
equitable expansion of regional transit.
379. See Farmer, supra note 14.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/economic_resilience/
sustainable_communities_regional_planning_grants (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/PMP8-FKWM.
383. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 649 (presenting the Sustainable Communities
Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of a new regionalism).
384. See, e.g., Al Yoon, Blackstone Offers Bond Tied to Rental Income, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 2013, at C4.
385. See id.

2014]

REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE

827

Innovative strategic partnerships between community groups and
business interests also present opportunities for regional interest
convergence. “[W]ith a clearer mutuality of interest, regional equity
coalitions should attract many more politically powerful interests,
including smart-growth, transportation alternatives, and environmental
advocates.”386 Thinking and acting regionally have been part of business
and industry strategic plans for decades.387 Advocacy efforts are
catching up. From the civil rights movement to the Occupy Wall Street
movement, coalitions are being formed to advocate for social and
economic justice.388 In the absence of regional governance structures,
business interests and public–private partnerships direct regional
growth,389 subordinating community interests to institutional interests in
regional affairs.390 Regional interest convergence can counter that
outcome because it speaks to both localist “issues of economic
competitiveness” and regionalist issues of “sustainability in ways that
appeal beyond the usual low-income constituencies.”391 Community
activists and business interests generally mistrust each other because
community activists’ emphasis on economic and social justice for
residents typically does not seemingly align with the economic and profit
emphasis of business interests.392 However, the expansive geography of
regions may prove fruitful for historical alliances between business and
regional equity advocates.393 In fact, “regional equity organizers tend to
take market realities into account” because “[t]hey know that business
can make money and do good in underserved communities, and they
understand that companies need to remain economically viable while
also paying higher wages.”394
Indeed, this helps to explain why equity issues are sometimes
slipped in through the backdoor of efforts to promote
competitiveness: since elites stand to lose ground in any direct
386. Troutt, supra note 68, at 1189.
387. See generally DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177.
388. See, e.g., Judy Lubin, The ‘Occupy’ Movement: Emerging Protest Forms and
Contested Urban Spaces, 25 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 184 (2012).
389. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 6–7. This is reminiscent of the rise of business
and public–private interests in inner-city development.
390. Id. This is similar to the lack of import afforded central-city residents impacted by
urban redevelopment projects.
391. Id. at 3.
392. See id. at 183.
393. See id. at 183–84.
394. Id. at 184.
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redistribution, they will be more persuaded by strategies that aid
the economy directly—and [through direct efforts] will also help
the poor.395
There are, of course, barriers to regional interest convergence.
These stem from general counterarguments to regionalism to specific
challenges to the interest convergence theory itself. Professor Bell
himself acknowledged that there are some limitations to the
applicability of the interest convergence theory.396 The strongest
barriers to regional interest convergence are (1) overcoming the selfinterests of the various regional constituents, (2) limited financial
resources, and (3) limited political will.397 These barriers, however, are
not insurmountable, particularly as the number of distressed localities
continues to grow, the nation’s demographics change, and regional
organizing efforts gain further traction.
The number of cities
experiencing financial instability and experimenting with new austerity
measures is forcing both urban and suburban leaders to identify
complimentary interests and call for more collaboration and increased
political support for regional efforts.398

395. Id. at 44. Many commentators have highlighted the fact that eliminating poverty in
a region is good for the businesses in the region. See, e.g., Manuel Pastor, Growing Together:
New Poverty Policy for New Times (prepared for the Charles Steward Mott Foundation
“Defining Poverty Reduction Strategies” Project, Aug. 2008), available at http://www.brookin
gs.edu/~/media/Events/2008/9/29%20poverty/pastor_paper.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/9
T9P-R3ZH. A more fundamental point about interest convergence theory has to be made at
this juncture. Much of the critique surrounding Bell’s interest convergence theory concerned
what some viewed to be a pessimistic outlook on human nature in general and race relations
in particular. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 26, at 254–55. Bell’s theory essentially maintains
that a successful interest convergence would advance the cause of the minority party without
negatively altering the status quo of the majority. See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33.
Regardless of whether one subscribes to this view or a broader articulation of Bell’s theory, a
new regionalist approach to local government interest convergence could actually improve
the status quo of local governments. As explained earlier, a new regionalist approach would
provide for a regional governance form that preserved local government autonomy. See
supra Part IV.A.1. Therefore, if local governments’ interest converged through the adoption
of a new regionalist model of governance, then local governments could obtain the benefits of
regional equity evidenced by a reduction in poverty and the region’s improved ability to
participate in the global market place.
396. See Bell supra note 27, at 523.
397. See, e.g., Justin Driver, supra note 241 (noting defining common interests,
accommodating diverse interest, and sustainability of converged interest as challenges to the
interest convergence theory); see also Cashin, supra note 150, at 2015–27 (discussing barriers
to new regionalism).
398. See Farmer, supra note 14.
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V. CONCLUSION
Poverty is no longer concentrated on certain vulnerable populations
in central cities and, like a true epidemic, is spreading into the suburbs.
Regional inequities consistently worsen, and localized mechanisms for
poverty alleviation are insufficient methods to address the problem.399
News headlines and nightly news broadcasts are replete with phrases
such as “the shrinking middle class” and “class warfare.”400 To date, the
response to this “class crisis” has yielded mixed results. The federal
government has affirmatively entered the conversation by taking such
steps as creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.401 In
addition, a new generation of grassroots movements has used organizing
lessons from past movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement, to
create new forms of protest.402 Given the breadth of the economic
issues, organizers have experienced challenges launching a sustainable
and focused offensive against economic injustice.403 Regional organizing
efforts, however, are becoming more coordinated and constructed for a
long-term engagement.404
As dire as the effects of the financial crisis are, it is important to
realize that they are the facts of a new regional geography. New
proposals have to meet the needs of the new regional spaces. Even past
proposals that were successful have to be revised to meet the new
regional reality so that regions are not ignored as relevant areas for
addressing problems currently conceived of as purely local.405 The

399. See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic Development and
the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131 (2004).
400. See, e.g., Michael R. Bloomberg, Federal Budgets and Class Warfare, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 2012, at A19; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Middle Class Is Steadily Eroding. Just Ask the
Business World., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A1; Bob Burnett, Class Warfare: The 2014
Election, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bobburnett/class-warfare-the-2014-election_b_5459057.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2014, 5:59
AM), archived at http://perma.cc/58KL-L436; Brian Darling, America’s Middle Class Is
Shrinking. So Who Is to Blame?, MAILONLINE (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.dailymai
l.co.uk/debate/article-2194390/Americas-middle-class-shrinking-So-blame.html, (last updated
Aug. 29, 2012, 9:56 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/7UET-XSNF.
401. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010); see also About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/8QRX-NRAX.
402. See, e.g., Lubin, supra note 388.
403. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
404. See Lubin, supra note 388, at 184–87.
405. See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 410 (commenting on the general planning process and
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recent collective efforts of the federal, state, and local governments and
grassroots economic justice movements demonstrate the country’s
readiness for a national conversation about class and inequity,
specifically, regional equity.
The regional interest convergence
mechanism proposed in this Article is not a panacea but a foundational
framework for navigating both the persistent poverty that has plagued
central cities for decades and the rise in suburban poverty. “This is no
time for romantic illusions and empty philosophical debates . . . . This is
a time for action. . . . What is needed is a strategy for change, a tactical
program.”406 Regional interest convergence responds to that call.

quoting an unnamed individual).
406. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? 59 (1967).

